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Unlike other major developed nations, the United States has never witnessed 
the development of a broad socialist-inspired movement, nor have its most prominent 
socialist party organizations ever achieved electoral success at the national level. It is 
the purpose of this dissertation to explain the exceptional nature of the nation’s social 
and political experience and, most importantly, to provide an informed, sensible and 
credible answer to why there is no socialist tradition in the United States. In order to do 
so, the analysis will focus on two influential works – Werner Sombart’s Why is there 
no Socialism in the United States? and Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks’ It 
didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United States –, both of which contain 
a comprehensive depiction of the American socialist movement at distinct historical 
times, and that, most importantly, provide well-founded answers to the initial research 
question. The main conclusions pertaining to why socialism did not thrive in the United 
States may be summarized as the product of the interaction of human agency and 
several distinctive factors of social, historical, political and economic nature. In 
addition, whilst the recent political developments may demonstrate that support for 
socialism in the United States is on the rise  –  especially amongst Democratic voters 
and the younger generations –, most indicators reveal that the latter still constitutes a 
minority. Hence, although support for socialist-inspired policies will most likely never 
cease to exist – regardless of its numerical expression –, there is ample reason to believe 
that the United States still remains as exceptional as ever in this regard. 
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The lack of a solid socialist tradition in the United States has long been 
considered an intriguing phenomenon within the academic community. Albeit the 
existence of several socialist-inspired parties and movements throughout American 
history, the ideology in question never truly obtained significant electoral expression – 
especially at the national level –, nor did it inspire a broad social movement amongst 
the population. In fact, when compared to the political and social experience of other 
developed nations, the limited adherence to the socialist ideology in the United States 
– which is politically manifested by the non-existence of a successful socialist-inspired 
third party or labor party, nor by the infiltration of the ideology within one of the two 
major parties –, along with other peculiar historical phenomena and occurrences, has 
often been depicted as a contributing element to the characterization of the prominent 
American exceptionalism thesis. 
Indeed, the principles on which the American nation was founded, and which 
still profoundly influence its society today – values such as “liberty, egalitarianism, 
individualism, populism and laissez-faire”,1 which Seymour Martin Lipset identified as 
being an intrinsic part of what he considered to be the “American creed”2 – seem to be 
at odds with what socialism represents. It is especially intriguing that, albeit their 
undeniably strong European heritage, Americans – particularly the working-class – 
never demonstrated a similar attachment to the socialist ideology as did their 
counterpart in the Old Continent. 
Furthermore, despite what the Marxist theory had predicted, the fact that an 
advanced capitalist society with such a substantial degree of economic and industrial 
 
1 (Lipset, 1996, p. 19) 
2 (Lipset, 1996, p. 19) 
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power as the United States was headed nowhere towards a socialist revolution 
concerned numerous leftist intellectuals ever since the end of the nineteenth century, 
including Lenin, who later dedicated their time to studying why American socialism 
had not achieved greater success, as would have been expected. It seems that most 
intellectual figures were well aware that, as Seymour Martin Lispet and Gary Marks 
put it, “the United States was a living contradiction of... Marxian theory, and raised 
fundamental questions about its validity”3 long before the Russian Revolution of 1917 
which later confirmed that the initial predictions had failed and that, instead, socialism 
was well under way in a semi-feudal nation.   
Hence, in order to fully comprehend why the United States lacked such a solid 
socialist tradition, I chose to rely on the academic works of renowned intellectuals 
which not only presented well founded arguments that had withstood the test of time, 
but also that, if possible, provided a detailed historical account of the nation’s character 
and its relation with socialism, including both the successes and shortcomings of the 
American socialist movements and its most prominent political actors. After having 
thoroughly researched the topic, it soon became apparent that there were two influential 
works which stood out as being quintessential to understanding the subject at hand: 
Werner Sombart’s Why is there no Socialism in the United States? and Seymour Martin 
Lipset and Gary Marks’ It didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United States.  
Werner Sombart’s book is often described as one of the finest earlier attempts 
of investigating the causes of why socialism was never truly successful amongst the 
American population. Albeit his political sympathies for the ideology in question, the 
German sociologist’s work provides a rigorous account of why there was such 
 
3 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p.19) 
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generalized resistance to Socialism in the United States, particularly for a work which 
was produced in the beginning of the Twentieth Century.4  
Furthermore, It didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United States, 
is widely recognized as a meticulous work that shines a light on a part of American 
history that is often forgotten. In this book, the authors set out to explore the main 
arguments that have been presented as having contributed to the failure of socialism in 
the United States and to ultimately analyze their validity. Albeit its special emphasis on 
the events that took place during the first half of the twentieth century – which is often 
declared as the height of the ideology’s popularity in the United States –, the fact that 
it was written nearly a century later than Sombart’s work entails that, contrary to the 
latter, Lipset and Marks were able to access the empirical knowledge that derived from 
the events of the past century and, consequently, incorporate it into their academic text. 
In addition, I will occasionally include quotes from American Exceptionalism: A 
double-edged sword, which is an earlier work of Seymour Martin Lipset that also partly 
explores the topic pertaining to my initial research question.  
I must add that, albeit having been considered at an early stage, I have chosen 
not to include Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy since its 
addition would compromise the depth of the analysis of the two previous works which 
have been mentioned due to the restrictions regarding the dissertation’s word limit. 
However, I fully recognize that it is a notable academic work which is particularly 
relevant when discussing the object of study in question.  
Moreover, I intend on complementing the authors’ main arguments by 
employing the ideas of various intellectuals and political figures who also delved into 
 
4 For instance, Sombart’s employment of the comparative approach and his use of detailed quantitative 
data regarding the wages of both German and American workers in distinct areas of activity in order to 
analyze their quality of live is especially impressive for a work which was produced at the time. 
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this issue or helped make the case for what we now commonly refer to as American 
exceptionalism, wherever it may seem relevant and appropriate to do so. Indeed, I 
believe it to be especially important to incorporate the arguments of earlier authors who 
precociously understood (or even helped shape) the inherent values that have 
accompanied Americans ever since their country’s independence – for instance, their 
strong attachment to individual liberty and intense suspicion of state interventionism – 
and that greatly contribute to the nation’s general contempt for the socialist ideology, 
namely Alexis de Tocqueville.  
Finally, after having analyzed the authors’ works in detail, I plan on revisiting 
their main arguments in the conclusion and consequently determining whether or not 
there are any contact points between the two academic theories, whilst addressing their 
overall validity in answering the research question that I set out to investigate. 
Additionally, despite it not being the primary purpose of this dissertation, I 
believe that it would be unwise not to address the recent developments in American 
politics and whether or not we may be witnessing the end of political exceptionalism in 
the United States. Indeed, it seems that socialism has presently gained momentum in 
the United States, particularly following the election of President Donald Trump and 
the “Bernie Sanders phenomenon” – who, despite not having won the Democratic 
nomination once again, was able to run two energetic Presidential campaigns in the last 
years. Whilst evidence suggests that support for socialism is still limited at the national 
level, there is no denying that the latter is on the rise, especially amongst the democratic 
voters and the younger generations.  
Hence, I will dedicate the last part of my conclusion to briefly commenting on 
whether this is an accurate portrayal of the recent political developments in the United 
States and, if so, on whether that might suggest that some of the contributing factors 
 9 
which had been associated to the lack of adherence of the American population to the 
socialist ideology might be losing ground and how that may affect both the American 
political and societal structure – namely how it may precipitate a broad social 
movement in American society or, in a more likely scenario, increasingly impel the 




















1st Part: Werner Sombart 
When beginning to address the question of Why is there no Socialism in the 
United States?, Werner Sombart dedicated his book’s introduction to describing the 
inherent conditions and factors that paved the way for capitalism’s success in the United 
States. The German author was especially interested in analyzing the workings of the 
American society in the beginning of the twentieth century and providing the readers 
with the tools to understand how the historical, geographic, demographic, societal and 
economic conditions at the time fueled the country’s resistance to socialism. Similarly, 
after presenting an overview of the earlier socialist experiences in the country, Sombart 
addressed not only why they failed to achieve greater electoral success, but also why 
they were unsuccessful in inspiring a nation-wide movement.   
The author commenced his book by writing that “the United States of America 
is capitalism’s land of promise. All conditions needed for its complete and pure 
development were first fulfilled here.”5 He then argued that the United States possessed 
a unique set of physical factors that enabled capitalism to thrive in an unparalleled way. 
According to the author, the country possessed a wide array of precious metals 
- including gold and silver -, fertile soils and a tremendous potential for territorial 
expansion. The latter was an especially important contributing factor for the success of 
capitalism. Unlike Europe, where almost no territory was left unclaimed and, therefore, 
there was limited potential for expansion – which led a set of European states to explore 
a number of territories in other continents, namely in order to profit from a more 
extensive market area –, the United States of America still possessed a vast territory 
that was virtually unexplored. This factor alone would constitute an unparalleled 
opportunity for trade, economic growth and development.  
 
5 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 3) 
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After having established the importance of the territory’s distinctive physical 
attributes, Sombart further delved into how other contributing factors had fostered an 
environment that was conductive to capitalism. For instance, the author argued that the 
European immigrants who chose to leave the Old Continent and embrace the New 
World wished to “carve themselves a new life based on principles of pure reason”6 and 
that, although they shared a common heritage with those who remained in Europe, they 
desired to put their past “feudal artisan experience”7 aside and utilize their sets of skills 
into building a more profitable world for themselves and their families. The boundaries 
of traditionalism and nobility which were still upheld in Europe had been set aside, 
leaving those who chose to live in the New World with a tremendous potential for both 
social and economic gain.8 
After having presented the factors that had contributed to establish what he 
considered to be the inherent characteristics that sustained the claim that the American 
territory was exceptionally favorable to capitalist expansion and that its inhabitants 
were fundamentally different from their European ancestors, Sombart proceeded to 
make an intricate critique of both the highly advanced state of capitalism in the United 
States and the American social structure. 
Sombart wrote that only in America had capitalism reached its highest stage of 
development and, according to the author, this was not without grave consequences. 
The never-ending desire for profit had, for one, legitimized a set of labor conditions 
that were deemed unacceptable in most European countries. The author exemplified his 
argument by shining a light on the number of railway accidents that happened in the 
United States of America and comparing them with those which occurred in Austria. 
 
6 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 4)  
7 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 4) 
8 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 4) 
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In only two years – from 1898 to 1900 –, nearly twenty-two thousand people were 
killed in railway accidents in the US. Additionally, whilst accidents happened at a rate 
of 19 per million passengers in America, the figures dropped to 0,99 per million 
passengers in Austria.9 According to the author, this apparent disregard for human life 
resulted in an unparalleled amount of financial rewards and capital accumulation.  
Furthermore, Sombart wrote that capitalism also deeply influenced America’s 
social structure. As has been previously established, in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Americans did not abide by the same rules that had shaped the European 
continent for the most part, as neither feudal nor aristocratic laws were imposed on 
them. Thus, according to the author, the inexistence of such a rigid social structure left 
people completely free to pursue their own interests, which included building a wealthy 
lifestyle for both themselves and their families. In a way, people were dazzled by the 
possibilities that capitalism could give them, which led them to underestimate the 
results of what the relentless pursuit for wealth could provoke. Consequently, Sombart 
came to the conclusion that “the entire lifestyle of the people increasingly adopted a 
manner suited to capitalism”.10 
In order to substantiate his claims that capitalism had a predominant role in 
shaping America’s social structure, the author gave a few examples of how this 
influence was becoming evident within American society.  
On one hand, Sombart was convinced that one of the manifestations of such 
influence was the country’s rapid process of urbanization. Although several statistics 
demonstrated that this process was indeed underway – namely how nearly a fifth of the 
population of the United States lived in cities of over one hundred thousand inhabitants 
 
9 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 5)  
10 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 11)  
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at the time –, the relation that the German author established between urbanism and 
capitalism had a deeper significance.  
Sombart characterized American urbanization as a process that was purely 
based on rational and quantitative factors, rather than spontaneous growth. By 
employing Ferdinand Tönnies’ famous ideal types of social organizations, the German 
author argued that, unlike most cities and towns in Europe which preserved the 
attributes of Gemeinschaft, those in the United States had been mostly organized 
according to the principles of Gesellschaft.11 
Regarding a similar matter, Tocqueville had also commented on Americans’ 
propensity to spontaneously form associations, which generally acted as a democratic 
intermediary between the State and the individual. On this matter, the French author 
famously wrote: 
 
“Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form 
associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in 
which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds – religious, moral, 
serious, futile, extensive, or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans 
make associations to give entertainments, to found establishments for 
education, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send 
missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, 
and schools. If it be proposed to advance some truth, or to foster some feeling 
by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever, at the 
 
11 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 8)  
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head of some new undertaking, you see the government in France, or a man of 
rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.”12 
 
On the other hand, according to the author, inequality was also an evident result 
of capitalism’s impact on America’s social structure. In his opinion, there was nowhere 
else in the world where the contrast between the poor and the rich was so conspicuous.  
In addition, Sombart argued that capitalism had inspired the creation of a 
national character which, in his opinion, displayed “startling uniformity”.13 According 
to the author, the binding similarity that inherently tied all Americans together and 
formed the so-called “American spirit”14, which was based on the fact that economic – 
and overall quantitative – principles were valued above all else and utilized in all 
situations, was a result of the capitalist-oriented structure of American social life. As 
Sombart wrote, “nowhere else is acquisitiveness as clearly seen as it is there, nor are 
the desire for gain and the making of money for its own sake so exclusively the be-all 
and end-all of every economic activity”.15  
Furthermore, the author dedicated the rest of the book’s introduction to briefly 
characterizing the nature and the extent of socialism in America and he started off by 
reinforcing the idea that if one wishes to understand the “mode of existence of the 
proletariat”,16 one must analyze how advanced the state of capitalism is in the country 
which one wishes to study.  
Moreover, the author further wrote how, according to the Marxist theory, 
socialism was a “necessary reaction to capitalism”.17 Although he believed this to be 
 
12 (Tocqueville, 1835/2000, II, p. 106) 
13 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 10) 
14 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 10) 
15 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 10)  
16 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 15)  
17 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 15) 
 15 
true, it seemed evident that this rationale was not entirely valid in the case of the United 
States. If it were true, and given the advanced state of capitalism in America, one would 
have expected to encounter a significant number of socialist supporters, which was 
evidently not the case.  
Nonetheless, Sombart did not agree with the perception that there was no 
socialism in the United States, nor did he believe that those who were supporters of 
such an ideology in the New World were merely a “few broken-down Germans without 
any following”.18 In order to prove the idea that, although socialist parties only enjoyed 
meager electoral success in the United States, the support for such parties was certainly 
not inexistent, the sociologist used the electoral data from the Presidential elections of 
1904 as an example that corroborated his previous argument. Indeed, in the Presidential 
elections of 1904, which had only occurred two years prior to the publishing of 
Sombart’s book, Eugene Debs - the candidate that had been nominated by the Socialist 
Party of America (SPUSA) - had obtained 403,338 votes.19 In fact, with approximately 
2.5% of the popular vote, Eugene Debs managed to have been the third most voted 
candidate, behind Alton B. Parker, the Democratic candidate, and Theodore Roosevelt, 
the Republican candidate and Incumbent President who succeeded in achieving his re-
election.  
Whilst Sombart was well aware that the vast majority of the Americans did not 
sympathize with the socialist ideology, the sociologist warned his readers that the 
latter’s generalized rejection did not necessarily convey that all Americans, particularly 
those pertaining to the working-class, were firmly against any type of reform, nor that 
they had entirely dissimilar concerns from their European counterparts, which was 
 
18 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 15) 
19 According to Sombart, the number of votes had risen from approximately 99,000 in the previous 
election and was extremely volatile. (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 16) 
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especially evident given the demands of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) at 
the time.20  
In this regard, as Michael Harrington argued in the forward of Sombart’s book, 
the exceptional character of the United States resided in the fact that, contrary to the 
European experience, “a worker in America could express his drive for equality in 
terms of, not in counterposition to, the prevailing ideology.”21 Whilst the European 
socialist movement’s main purpose upon its creation was to tackle civil-rights issues 
and strive towards “bourgeois equality”,22 not only did most Americans already enjoy 
such rights – which had been granted and safeguarded by the Constitution –, but it was 
also possible for the working-class to demand for change within the existing political 
system, ultimately deeming socialism unnecessary. Thus, Harrington believed that 
socialism had never been especially attractive in the United Sates because 
“Americanism” – or, in other words, “the American ideology” – was already a 
progressive form of capitalism, which incorporated liberal values such as 
egalitarianism. 
Sombart further proceeded to identifying some of the characteristics that 
differentiated the American working-class from their continental European counterpart, 
which he believed also stemmed from the former’s inherent capitalist outlook on life. 
The author classified American workers as “optimistic” and “patriotically inclined”.23 
Unlike the continental-European proletariat, most American workers were not 
intrinsically dissatisfied with their lives, nor were they opposed to the prevailing 
 
20 Some of those demands included “the introduction of a legal work-day of not more than eight hours, 
the nationalization of telegraphs, telephones, railroads, and mines and the abolition of the monopoly 
system of landholding, and the substitution therefore of a title of occupancy and use only.” (Sombart, 
1906/1976, p. 18) 
21 (Harrington, 1976, p. x) 
22 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 18) 
23 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 18) 
 17 
capitalist system. Instead, Sombart argued that they “loved capitalism”, 24 and wished 
to readily participate in reaping its benefits, even if it meant being exposed to a 
significant amount of peril when doing so. Moreover, the relationship between capital 
and labor was viewed as something that ought to be dealt with by employing a business-
like approach.  
Furthermore, Sombart wrote that the same rationale could be applied to the 
operation of most American trade unions or other worker’s organizations. The author 
argued that, whereas the largest German trade unions united their workers in 
“oppositional consciousness”25 against their employers and sought to reap both labor 
and social rights from this struggle, their American counterparts wished to reap benefits 
from working within the system and engaging with those who Sombart named the 
“bourgeois social reformers”,26 namely “non-partisan social reformers.”27  
The sociologist was especially interested in understanding the workings of the 
AFL, which was made up of a variety of trade unions and accounted for “more than 
four-fifths of all organized workers in America”.28 According to the author, although 
the latter included a set of socialist-led trade unions, the vast majority of its groups and 
its leadership engaged in a “purely business approach”29 to representing their fellow 
associates “without much regard for the proletarian class as a whole and without even 
less regard for the underclass of unskilled workers.” 30  Sombart was critical of its 
general configuration and argued that it was producing a “vertical structuring of the 
proletariat”.31 
 
24 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 20) 
25 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 22) 
26 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 23) 
27 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 23) 
28 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 21) 
29 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 21) 
30 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 22) 
31 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 22) 
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Given the circumstances at the time, it was precisely this idea of American 
exceptionalism that intrigued Sombart and incited him to delve into the issue of why 
the socialist ideology had never permeated crucial areas of American society, such as 
politics and unionism, nor why it failed to garner widespread support amongst the 
American people, as opposed to what had generally occurred in the European Continent 
– from where most New World immigrants originated –, and whether or not it was 
expected that the trend would remain unchanged in the future.32  
 
1.1 The political factors that condition socialism’s success in the U.S 
In the first section of his book, Werner Sombart intended on examining not only 
how a set of distinct political factors affected the position and condition of the American 
worker, but also how certain features from what he considered to be the “American 
life”33 influenced the country’s politics.  
Firstly, the author argued against the common understanding that the United 
States’ unique political choices were simply a product of the inherent “anti-socialist” 
characteristics of the Anglo-Saxons. Sombart promptly rejected this notion and argued 
that the Anglo-Saxons were not, in fact, entirely unsusceptible to socialist-inspired 
ideas, which could be proved by the popularity of the Chartist movement in England, 
as well as “the pattern political development in the Australian colonies and even in the 
mother country”.34 Furthermore, the sociologist resorted to the 1900 Census in order to 
make the case that the majority of the New World proletariat did not consist of Anglo-
Saxons. Instead, German immigrants had largely contributed to the American working 
force and, given this fact, an unanswered question remained: Why were there millions 
 
32 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 23) 
33 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 28) 
34 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 27) 
 19 
of workers who had travelled from countries where socialism had thrived and chose not 
to uphold the same ideology in America? 
Moreover, the author addressed how the United States’ complex political 
machine was creating a set of problems, namely how it was one of the issues that he 
considered to be at the core of why neither American socialist nor social-democratic 
parties had enjoyed political success. The sociologist began his argument by stating that 
the United States had an intricate democratic system of government due to how it was 
internally organized according to federal laws.  
According to Sombart, there was no denying that the United States had a 
democratic form of government, not only since universal suffrage had been 
institutionalized as the law in all federal states,35 but especially due to the extent to 
which one could exercise one’s right to vote. Indeed, the American man had the 
possibility to vote not just for the legislative branch of government, but also “almost all 
higher administrative officials and superior judges.”36  
The demanding nature of the United States’ political system, along with the 
large dimension of the country in question, made it necessary for there to be 
professionals in charge of managing and supervising this nationwide process. This 
scenario created incentives for what Sombart named the “demagogues who endeavored 
to take possession of the electoral machinery for themselves”37 and was aggravated by 
the “democratic tidal wave”38 of the 1820s. According to the author, the complexities 
of the electoral machine also negatively affected people’s political participation.  
 
35 One must note that formal and informal restrictions were still in place at the time, namely concerning 
both womens’ and African-Americans’ voting rights. 
36 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 29) 
37 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 31) 
38 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 31) 
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Furthermore, the phenomenon that Werner Sombart described also had a 
profound financial implication in the American political system. In the sociologist’s 
words: “finances must correspond with the amount of manpower available, so that the 
adequate functioning of the Machine is made possible.”39 According to Sombart, both 
the average election and campaign costs in America at the time confirmed this idea.40 
Thus, political parties were also profoundly limited by their own financial capabilities, 
which made it even more difficult for a newcomer to acquire an influential position in 
a scenario that was traditionally dominated by two major players. 
According to Sombart, the American political system – aggravated by the 
monopoly of the Republicans and the Democrats – created disproportionate incentives 
for people to support the two major parties for a multitude of reasons, which, in his 
opinion, ultimately strengthened capitalism itself. 
In the case of self-interest, given that the “Spoils System”41 applied, if one were 
to aspire to reach an important administrative position, for example, one would have a 
strong incentive to become an ally of either the Republicans or the Democrats, 
depending on a set of factors, such as the record of their results in a particular 
geographical area. This incentive would derive from the perception that the placement 
of people in certain offices was carried out mostly according to the party allegiance of 
the candidate – which seemed to be the strongest factor –, rather than his/her 
qualifications. According to the author, this structure also had notable implications 
within the trade unions, especially the most influential ones, as the leading trade 
unionists fell prey to the influence of the larger parties. In many cases, the promise of 
 
39 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 32) 
40 For instance, according to Sombart, “the total expenses for the Presidential campaign are estimated at 
$5,000,000.” (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 32) 
41 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 35) 
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a more rewarding position in trade for their allegiance would render them “harmless” 
in pursuing their initial goals of improving general social and labor conditions.42 
However, the incentive system that “binded the great mass of people to the old 
parties”43 also applied to cases other than self-interest. If one had a strong desire to pass 
a reform or shape public policy, one would also naturally ally oneself with those who 
had the power to see it through, regardless of one’s political inclinations, for practical 
reasons. 
The author further wrote that there were also a set of “hidden causes” which 
explained why two specific political parties dominated the American system – and, 
consequently, earned the majority of the proletarian vote – and that, in order to fully 
understand the reasoning behind this phenomenon, one should study in depth their 
particular characteristics and what the author would later deem their “inner nature”.44 
On this matter, first and foremost, Sombart argued that there were no significant 
differences between the two major parties in the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The issues that had once divided the Federalist Party from the Democratic-Republican 
Party, such as their “respective positions towards the roles of the Federal government 
and the individual states”,45 were no longer applicable in order to distinguish their 
successors – the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, respectively – at the time 
during which the author was writing his book. According to the sociologist, the political 
parties’ positions regarding issues such as trade, currency or even State intervention 
were not nearly as distinct as they ought to have been.  
Furthermore, Sombart further wrote that the Republican Party which had 
“emerged with a sharply defined program whose essential point was the determined 
 
42 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 36) 
43 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 37) 
44 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 44) 
45 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 45) 
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opposition to slavery”46 at the time of the Civil War, was not dismantled when its prime 
objective was accomplished, as it should have been. With this example, the author was 
reinforcing his previous argument that what had truly motivated the durability of both 
parties within the American political system was not their devotion to promoting their 
own “clashing” ideals, but rather their dedication to upholding the same incentive 
scheme which permitted the winner to choose whom he wished for certain offices 
“based on the principle that to the victor belong the spoils.”47  
Additionally – and this seems be what concerned Werner Sombart the most –, 
it was not even possible to distinguish the two major parties according to the social 
class of its supporters. In fact, the author believed that other factors aside from class 
membership played an even more important role in influencing a person’s vote at the 
time, such as geography and place of origin. 
Thus, according to the author, the characteristics of the two major political 
parties – be it their lack of clear and distinctive political principals, their social 
heterogeneity or the distorted incentives which fueled their purpose –, made it 
extremely easy for American workers to ally themselves with either one. Indeed, when 
choosing which party one should support, it was easier to be practical and consider 
which had more influence over a certain place at a given time, for example, rather than 
trying to decipher the party that came the closest to one’s personal and societal ideals.  
According to the author, in knowing that the masses were the roots of the two 
major parties, they were both obliged to retain the people’s unwavering trust and high 
spirits by “making concessions to the wage-laboring class whose members, at least in 
many districts, deliver the decisive votes.”48 One example of such a concession was 
 
46 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 48) 
47 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 35) 
48 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 51) 
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their increasing adoption of “the system of questioning candidates”,49 also known as 
the Winnekta system,50 to which most supporters of the socialist parties were opposed, 
as it represented how, once more, the two major political parties had been able to 
reinforce the worker’s vote by administering a partial remedy to solve a problem which, 
in their opinion, would only be truly solved with the adoption of a socialist agenda. 
After having presented a set of reasons that hindered the emergence and success 
of socialist parties within the United States due to the intricacies of the American 
political system, Sombart attempted to explain why the ideology itself remained 
unpopular amongst the people, especially the working class.  
The Americans, he argued, had in fact developed a strong devotion to both the 
“existing State” and their Constitution.51 According to the author, this particularly 
powerful connection derived from the long-established principle of popular 
Sovereignty within the United States. This sentiment in which “the citizen believes that 
he is still king in the State and that he can bring things to order if he only wants to”52 
was especially exacerbated not only by the fact that Americans were frequently called 
upon to vote in numerous elections, but also due to the decisive role of public opinion 
in decision-making – which was generally known to work in favor of the proletariat in 
a number of cases. 
However, Sombart was adamant on reinforcing the idea that the existence of a 
democratic principle, which formally bestowed equality of rights upon all its citizens, 
 
49 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 51) 
50 According to the author, the Winnekta system “consists of the representatives of the workers’ interests, 
i.e., the leaders of the trade unions or of the large trade-union alliances, presenting to the candidate who 
wants the workers’ vote a carefully prepared questionnaire and making their decision whether to vote for 
him or not dependent upon the outcome of the questioning” (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 51) 
51 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 55) 
52 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 56) 
 24 
was not a sufficient condition to guarantee the general welfare of the people. On this 
matter, the author wrote that: 
 
“A radical-democratic system of government can indeed attract the population 
of the idea of the State, but it will not be able to prevent criticism of the 
prevailing society, and especially of the existing economic order, if the latter 
does not also guarantee a tolerable material existence to the people.” 53 
 
1.2 The economic factors that condition socialism’s success in the U.S 
In the second section of Werner Sombart’s book, the author intended on 
illustrating how a set of economic factors within American society have also hindered 
both the electoral success of socialist parties in the United States and the inhabitant’s 
adherence to the ideology in question. In order to do so, the sociologist chose to make 
a comparative analysis based on the empirical data that he collected from the two 
realities which he wished to examine: Europe – especially continental Europe and, most 
particularly, Germany – and the United States of America. In making this comparative 
analysis, by studying a set of decisive economic factors and conditions, his principal 
aim was to measure the standards of living of workers in both continents and draw 
conclusions that could partly explain why, albeit its success in Europe, socialism had 
failed to thrive in the United States.54 
 
53 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 58) 
54  Sombart reserved the first two pages of this section in order to exclusively comment on his 
methodological choice. Although the author recognized that the comparative analysis was flawed – 
especially given the lack of data regarding some aspects which he wished to examine –, he was not only 
confident that he could compensate for this issue by looking for other sources of data without 
compromising his initial intention, but also that this approach was indeed the right choice for what he 
had set out to do in the second section of the book. 
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The author started by analyzing the average wages earned by industrial workers 
in America and how they were distributed geographically. According to first set of the 
data that Sombart presented, which was based on the 1900 Census, the average wages 
for industrial workers throughout the United States was homogenous, with an obvious 
exception that was detectable in all of the three categories (men’s, women’s and 
children’s wages): the Southern states.  
To get a better understanding of the distribution of wages, and how there was 
an evident disparity between the American and the German reality regarding this 
matter, the sociologist was adamant on comparing the average salary of workers from 
both continents in the same industry. After presenting a table that contrasted the average 
wage earned by American and German workers in a set of industries – such as the 
leather, tobacco and chemical industries –, the author provided a number of particular 
cases where he was certain that the external influencing factors would be minimized.  
For instance, in one given table, Sombart presented his readers with the 
“distributions of average weekly wages or wage rates of adult male workers in the 
woodworking industries in 1902 in Germany and in 1900 in the United States.” In this 
particular case, 41.2% of German workers earned less than 20.01 marks each week, 
whereas only 3.2% of American workers received less than 5 US dollars 
(approximately 21 marks) for the same type of work in the same industry.  
The data that Werner Sombart gathered, however flawed, revealed a pattern that 
led to an inescapable conclusion: wages in the United States were significantly higher 
than those that were practiced in Germany. In fact, according to the author, not only 
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were the former “at least twice as high”55 as the latter, but, in a set of particular cases, 
a “fourfold difference”56 could also be reached. 
However, even though there was an obvious discrepancy in terms of wages, 
since Sombart’s aim was to evaluate the living standards of workers in both continents, 
determining the cost of living in Germany and the United States was paramount. 
Regarding this topic, the author firstly argued that prices in America were “particularly 
influenced by two forces: the continuing colonial character of the country and the 
highly developed state of capitalism.”57 
According to the sociologist, the former was especially evident given the high 
price of labor and the cheap price of land in the United States. Therefore, all products 
that were manufactured based on highly intensive labor methods were expensive. The 
same rationale applied to services, especially those which were considered to be a 
luxury, such as domestic workers. However, this inherent characteristic also rendered 
products that were more reliant on land and, thus, more conditioned by its price, 
cheaper. Sombart wrote that this was perceptible in the case of agriculture products 
“grown in bulk”, 58 which he considered to be relatively inexpensive.  
Furthermore, the highly advanced state of capitalism had also manifested itself 
in innovative technology, which reduced both the cost and the price of mass 
manufactured products. On this matter, Sombart concluded that “America becomes 
more expensive as more personal services are required and the demand for luxury 
increases.”59 
 
55 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 74) 
56 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 74) 
57 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 75) 
58 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 75) 
59 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 75) 
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In order to provide a more detailed analysis on the cost of living in both the 
United States and Germany, the author then proceeded to examine and compare a set 
of essential components in a typical worker’s life, namely housing, lighting, heating, 
room-furnishings, nutrition and clothing prices.  
According to Sombart, carrying out this research was admittedly difficult, since 
many factors were at play. For instance, when analyzing housing prices in both 
countries, the author pointed out that one’s initial perception might be mistaken. 
Although the empirical evidence gathered by the sociologist revealed that, at the time, 
Americans paid a somewhat larger rent than their German counterpart, their houses 
were generally equipped with better conditions, such as heating. Thus, after further 
research, the author concluded that Americans actually paid less than the Germans for 
a house with the same requirements. 
The author had a similar conclusion regarding lighting and room-furnishings. 
Whereas the Americans paid less for lighting given their countries’ abundance in 
natural resources, including oil, they also spent less money in order to buy a set of 
“standard items of furniture.”60 Although one should not dismiss the differences in 
quality when comparing room-furnishings, Sombart’s data evidenced that, at the time, 
Germans were obliged to spend more on staple furniture pieces than their counterpart. 
However, when writing on heating, nutrition and clothing prices, the 
sociologist’s conclusions were slightly different. For instance, heating prices were 
generally the same in both countries, as they were highly dependent on the price of 
bituminous coal, which had an equivalent value in the two continents at the time.  
Furthermore, when analyzing the prices of several food items, the author 
encountered a greater set of difficulties, namely the distinct nutritional habits – which 
 
60 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 82) 
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meant that, when comparing food items, one should be aware that the price of certain 
commodities would have a greater impact on one population, whilst being possibly 
insignificant for the other –, the variations in quality and even the price oscillations 
depending on the time of year. Nonetheless, after presenting a succinct analysis on the 
nutritional habits and the prices of such items in both countries, Sombart argued that 
“the prices of the most important foodstuffs are by and large the same in the United 
States as in Germany.”61  
Finally, when analyzing clothing prices, other complexities arose which made 
it problematic for Sombart to provide a wide array of empirical data. Once again, these 
complexities were mostly related to existing disparities in quality. For instance, 
although two jackets may be manufactured with entirely different materials, for 
statistical purposes, they may not be distinguished as distinct clothing items. 
Additionally, it may be customary for a population to buy a certain type of clothing or 
to prefer a specific material in detriment of another. Evidently, these possibilities 
introduced a great challenge. However, albeit limited, the data that Sombart was able 
to collect allowed him to state that “one will find that even clothing costs the American 
worker no more, or only infinitesimally more, than it does his German counterpart.”62  
Given that we have previously established that American workers earned higher 
wages and generally paid the same – or even less – for a number of essential 
components such as housing, the author was interested in knowing where and how these 
families would generally spend their domestic budget surplus. The author was certain 
that the answer could only be one of three: either American families saved a 
 
61 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 82) 
62 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 92) 
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considerable amount of money or they spent it in order to “extravagantly”63 fulfill their 
basic necessities or with the purpose of obtaining luxury products and/or services. 
In order to answer the previous question, Sombart gathered a number of studies 
which analyzed a considerable array of worker’s housekeeping budgets in locations 
such as Washington, Massachusetts, Berlin and Nuremberg. 64  The author’s first 
conclusion was that American workers did not channel most of their household budget 
surplus into savings. In fact, although the data showed that American workers generally 
saved more than their German counterpart, it was still far less than what one might have 
expected, considering the significant difference between what they earned and the cost 
of living.  
Thus, one thing was certain: American workers were spending a part of their 
generous household budget surplus. Furthermore, the sociologist argued that, similarly 
to what he had suspected, the data confirmed that American workers were less frugal 
than their German counterpart in satisfying their primary needs. As a result, in sum, the 
former generally acquired bigger houses with overall superior conditions; bought better 
clothing and had the means to replace it more often; and ate more robust meals than 
their European colleagues. In fact, as Sombart himself observed, the data confirmed 
that the American worker’s life paralleled the standards of the “better sections of the 
German middle class” 65  or of the bourgeoisie, rather than those of their German 
counterpart. Interestingly, this more extravagant manner in which American workers 
chose to live meant that, after having fulfilled their primary needs, they ended up with 
 
63 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 93) 
64 Similarly to what has been previously observed throughout the book, the American statistics were 
more reliable than the German data. For instance, whilst the largest German study that Sombart presented 
was composed of approximately nine hundred household budgets, the statistics gathered from the 
“Washington Bureau of Labor” were made up of more than twenty-five thousand household budgets. 
This introduced obvious discrepancies which Sombart endeavored to overcome. 
65 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 97) 
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a similar percentage of money for other expenses – such as religious donations, taxes 
and entertainment – to the German workers in relative terms. 
Therefore, after having presented a detailed description of the economic 
situation of the proletariat in both the United States of America and Germany, Sombart 
argued that there was an indisputable conclusion: the American worker lived a much 
more comfortable life than his European counterpart.  
Moreover, the author argued that this irrefutable fact had an evidently profound 
impact on the lack of success of the socialist ideology in the United States. Indeed, the 
American proletariat’s high living standards were a product of capitalism and, thus, the 
idea of overthrowing the political and economic order that had led to the worker’s 
prosperity could not be further away from the people’s minds.  
Additionally, in the final paragraphs of this section, Sombart intentionally 
addressed a matter that had been hinted at throughout his book. Ever since its 
introduction, the author was keen on emphasizing how the United States had become a 
precocious consumerist society. According to the sociologist, unlike many of their 
European counterparts, American workers lived in a state of “comfortable 
domesticity”66 and, once “they experienced the temptations of materialist depravity”, 67 
they became dependent on the system that had provided the goods and services that 
they longed for. Therefore, the American workers were persuaded to acquire a 
capitalist-oriented mindset in order to uphold their materialistic society, to which they 
had become accustomed. Patriotism was also an inevitable outcome, as the workers 
grew proud of the United States’ advanced state of capitalism, which was not only 
 
66 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 105) 
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producing astounding internal benefits, but also pushing other nations in what they 
considered to be the direction of progress. 
Interestingly, Tocqueville also wrote about materialism and its unintended long-
term consequences. Indeed, the philosopher warned about the dangers that arise if one 
neglects to comprehend the intrinsic value of freedom and, instead, appreciates it for 
the material goods that it yields. On this matter, he wrote: 
“Nor do I believe that a true love for liberty can ever be inspired by the sight of 
the material advantages it procures, for they are not always clearly visible. It is 
very true that, in the long run, liberty always yields, to those who know how to 
preserve it, comfort, independence, and often wealth, but there are times when 
it disrupts these blessings for a while, and there are times when their immediate 
enjoyment can only be secured by a despotism. Those who only value liberty 
for the sake of material advantages have never preserved it long.”68 
 
1.3 The social factors that condition socialism’s success in the U.S 
 
According to Werner Sombart, American workers not only benefitted from 
more favorable economic conditions than their European counterpart, but they also 
generally profited from a better social environment. The author argued that the “social 
position of the worker”,69 namely “his relations to people and social institutions, and in 
his position in and to society”,70 was profoundly different to the European state of 
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affairs. The sociologist claimed that, whereas ideals such as equality and liberty were 
still a dream in the old continent, they had become a reality in the United States.71 
Furthermore, Sombart was adamant on attributing the cause of such a favorable 
“social position of the worker” 72  to both the “radical-democratic system of 
government” 73  and to the “comfortable standard of living” 74  of the American 
proletariat, which we have previously established. In the author’s view, the societal 
results that this combination produced were obvious, such as the fact that public life 
was infinitely more democratic in the United States than anywhere else in the world. 
For instance, social class was not viewed as an impediment in the United States. 
On the contrary, American workers were not ashamed of their situation and alternately 
cultivated self-respect. Instead of class, Americans seemed to revere work. According 
to Sombart, this was yet another aspect in which American society was intrinsically 
different from its European counterpart. On this matter, Sombart wrote that: 
 
“In his appearance, in his demeanor, and in the manner of his conversation, the 
American worker also contrasts strongly with the European one. He carries his 
head high, walks with a lissome stride, and is as open and cheerful in his 
expression as any member of the middle class. There is nothing oppressed or 
submissive about him. He mixes with everyone – in reality and not only in 
theory – as an equal.”75 
 
 
71 One must note that this was not entirely true for all inhabitants of the United States, especially not for 
a large part of its African American community, particularly those who lived and worked in the Southern 
States.  
72 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 109) 
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 33 
Moreover, this logic was also applicable to the relation between the workers 
and their employers in most businesses. Similarly to what has been previously 
established as being the case for most areas of American society, their business-oriented 
relationship was based on practical principles. Instead of adopting a hostile approach 
by setting in place an adversarial logic that was reminiscent of feudal times and that 
was commonplace in Europe, most American employers provided a set of amenities to 
their workers – such as the possibility of taking one or two days off work, having cigar-
breaks, providing better heating and cooling conditions in the workplace or even 
supplying their employees with showers and lockers 76  –, which instilled in the 
employees a greater sense of dedication for the business which they were actively 
contributing to.  
However, according to Sombart, this “small gifts preserve friendship”77 policy 
was merely an intricate means to an end. In the author’s view, this “generosity in small 
matters”78 approach was put in place in order to keep the workers in high spirits so that 
they wouldn’t be able to acknowledge their real condition, which was one of 
exploitation.79 
Furthermore, according to Sombart, the informal system that was set in place 
by most businesses in the United States in order to instill the idea that the workers’ and 
the employers’ interests were aligned, and that the former reaped as many benefits from 
 
76 Despite having argued that American workers generally received better amenities than their European 
counterpart, Sombart stated that most employers in the United States provided less protective measures 
in the workplace. In fact, this is not the first time that the author has linked the advanced state of 
capitalism with lack of security or protective measures. For instance, in the introduction of Why is there 
no Socialism in the United States?, the author provided empirical evidence that demonstrated how the 
never-ending pursuit of profit had indirectly caused the death of millions of railway workers at a much 
larger rate than those which occurred in Europe at the time.  
77 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 111) 
78 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 112) 
79 This is one of the cases where Sombart’s sympathies for the Marxist theory are apparent. This line of 
thought coincides with the latter’s view on the workings of capitalist society and the workers’ condition 
of exploitation.  
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capitalism as the latter, was composed of a set of cross-cutting measures, which 
included profit sharing, accepting employees’ suggestions and complaints – certain 
enterprises would often make a “suggestion box” available for this purpose – or even 
by enticing them to buy company stock. In the author’s view, this particular course of 
action was producing the desired effects. The American proletariat was infinitely more 
involved – both physically and psychologically – in their employer’s business than the 
European counterpart, namely by becoming increasingly more dependent on its 
success. Thus, not only did this system discourage the adversarial logic that defined the 
relation between those two groups in the Old Continent, but it also enabled workers to 
acquire a “capitalist mentality.”80 
In the book’s last pages, Werner Sombart addressed what he believed to be the 
main questions in his readers’ minds: did all of the political, economic and social factors 
that the author presented throughout his work constitute a sufficient reason to explain 
how socialism had failed to achieve tangible success in the United States? Additionally, 
did they fully explain why American workers did not wish to overthrow the prevailing 
economic system? 
Albeit having thoroughly delved into such issues throughout the book, as he 
approached the end of his notable work, the sociologist wished to emphasize how two 
factors were indispensable in explaining both the American “proletarian psyche”81 and 
the lack of socialism in the United States.  
Firstly, Sombart was certain that a defining characteristic of American society 
– and, consequently, of the American “proletarian psyche”82 itself – was the tangible 
possibility of class movement. For several reasons – namely “the newness of society, 
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its democratic character, the smaller gap between the employing class and the workers, 
the colonial vigor of many of its immigrants and the Anglo-Saxon determination of 
purpose” 83 –, in no other country was it as likely that a member of the working-class 
had such high prospects of becoming wealthy and moving up in society. However, as 
has been previously established, the American proletariat did not live obsessed with 
questions of class nor did they feel as stigmatized by others – namely employees – as 
did their European counterpart. According to the author, the motivation that fueled 
people’s desires of fulfilling “The American Dream” and achieving “petty-bourgeois 
livelihoods” 84  was, in fact, attaining freedom from the constraints that capitalism 
imposed on the working-class people. 
Furthermore, Sombart argued that the United States provided the dissatisfied 
worker with another indispensable tool towards attaining his freedom. The scarcely 
populated lands of the West had an enormous potential that, in the beginning of the 20th 
Century, was yet to be fully explored. Thus, several American policies incentivized the 
migration of people to the Central and Western states, mostly by facilitating grants of 
land to those who wished to become independent farmers in such territories. This was 
the case of the Homestead Act, which came into effect in 1863 and allowed for citizens 
over twenty-one “the right to take possession of eighty acres of public land if these 
acres lie within railway land grants, or 160 acres if they are located elsewhere”85 for a 
small fee. 
As expected, the Homestead Act produced considerable results in the second 
half of the 19th Century. According to the author’s calculations – which were based on 
the data that he retrieved from the Census –,  “an area with twice the expanse of the 
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German Empire became cultivated for the first time in the two decades from 1870 to 
1890.”86 Additionally, a significant amount of those who wished to live as independent 
farmers in the Western territories of the United States were not only immigrants but 
also Americans, some of which deserted industrialized urban areas in order to pursue 
this alternate course of action. 
However, in order to establish a causal link between this form of migration and 
the advancement of capitalism, Sombart focused on tracking the evolution in the 
number of Homesteads on a yearly basis. The sociologist’s conclusion was that their 
numbers rose in years of economic depression. Since there was an evident decrease in 
immigration to the United States during such years, the logical explanation would 
indicate that Americans who lived in industrialized areas chose to migrate to the West 
due to financial uncertainty and/or difficulty. Sombart argued that, as people became 
increasingly displeased with capitalism and opted to disperse by migrating to the West 
in years of economic depression – namely in the 1880s, when the United States’ 
economy was hit by a downfall –, they failed to sustain the rise of alternative political 
parties and social movements in the industrialized urban areas where they might have 
had the largest change of success. 
In fact, in the author’s view, the mere acknowledgment of the fact that one had 
the possibility to choose freedom over capitalism, namely by becoming an independent 
farmer in the Western territories of the United States, profoundly shaped the “American 
proletarian psyche.”87 According to the sociologist, the existence of such a choice 
pacified any of the workers’ desires to rebel against the prevailing economic system. 
Thus, Sombart came to the inevitable conclusion that, alongside many other 
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determinant factors, the existence of “free, unsettled land”88 was perhaps one of the 
most essential components to what we now know as American exceptionalism. 
Finally, the author ended his work with a controversial statement which, for the 
most part, contradicted his findings and for which he did not provide any further 
explanations: 
 
“These are roughly the reasons why there is (no) Socialism in the United States. 
However, my present opinion is as follows: all the factors that until now have 
prevented the development of Socialism in the United States are about to 
disappear or to be converted into their opposite, with the result that in the next 
generation Socialism in America will very probably experience the greatest 
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2nd Part: Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks 
 Similarly to Werner Sombart’s earlier endeavor, albeit with a contemporary 
perspective, It didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United States set out to 
provide an explanation to why, contrary to the experience of similarly developed 
nations, there had not been a viable party nor a widespread socialist movement 
throughout the history of the United States.  
 In order to explain the phenomenon, Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks 
aimed at examining the validity of the main arguments that were professed by 
prominent intellectuals, politicians and academics ever since the end of the nineteenth 
century. Additionally, they intended on making a thorough comparative analysis of 
various plausible hypothesis by testing them “across and within countries”,90 with the 
purpose of isolating “as far as possible the causal effects of particular factors.”91 In 
doing so, the authors wished to provide “not only a political sociology of Socialism’s 
failure in the United States, but larger insights into American society and polity.”92 
2.1 The essence of American exceptionalism 
 After having explained their aims and the methodology they intended on using 
throughout the book,  the authors dedicated the first chapter of their work to providing 
an overview on the most popular arguments that had been put forth by renowned leftist 
intellectuals in order to explain the absence of socialism in the “New World.”  
 As was previously mentioned in the introduction of this work, according to the 
political and economic theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the socialist 
revolution would inevitably occur in the most developed capitalist countries of the 
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world. Given that the United States had been at the forefront of capitalist development 
ever since the end of the nineteenth century, various leftist intellectuals promptly 
declared that it would be most likely be one of the first nations to witness a socialist 
revolution. Thus, as it became increasingly clear that socialism was nowhere near to 
attaining extensive support amongst the American people – not even amidst the 
working class –, prominent socialist figures promptly set out to justify the latter’s 
absence from both the United States’ society and politics.  
Hence, in the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, several 
leftist figures, namely Werner Sombart, published detailed works that addressed not 
only how the United States differed from other industrial societies at the time, but also 
how those differences directly impacted socialism’s progress in the New World. 
However, as the authors mentioned, American exceptionalism remained a source of 
embarrassment to most socialist intellectuals – especially after the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917 –, as it was an indisputable contradiction of the Marxist theory.  
 Lipset and Marks further wrote that, according to the pre-World War I socialists, 
one of the most distinguishing social factors that characterized American society, 
especially when compared to the countries of the Old Continent, was “the absence of a 
feudal past”.93 On this matter, the authors quoted both Friedrich Engels and Max Weber 
who, more than a century before their work was published, had also attributed particular 
importance to this defining characteristic of American exceptionalism and widely 
commented on how it negatively affected socialism’s possibility of success in what 
Weber had previously deemed as “the only pure bourgeois country.”94  
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 Furthermore, the consequent value system that was established due to the 
unique circumstances in which the United States was founded was also a decisive factor 
that remained entrenched within American society throughout the twentieth century. 
On this matter, Lipset and Marks wrote that such values included “both secular, liberal 
laissez-faire and America’s distinctive, individualistic religious tradition, based on the 
dominance of the Protestant sects that, as [Max] Weber stressed, facilitated the rise of 
capitalism.”95 
 Moreover, socialist authors also highlighted the role of the Constitution and the 
generalized antagonism towards centralized power – which also profoundly flourished 
within the labor movement – as indispensable contributors to the “essence of American 
exceptionalism.” 96  Additionally, leftist intellectuals not only alluded to how racial 
heterogeneity and large-scale immigration also inherently defined the American reality 
at the time, but also how they contributed to hindering the chances of a successful 
socialist party and movement in the United States. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Marx and Engels had already addressed these matters by arguing that class 
consciousness was compromised by ethnic diversity since it put “native-born white 
workers” 97  in an advantageous position over other workers, “thus enabling the 
bourgeoisie to play workers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds against one 
another.”98 
 However, as the socialist intellectuals of the beginning of the twentieth century 
rightly noted, the previous social and cultural variables were not entirely responsible 
for the absence of socialism in the United States. Firstly, various economic factors also 
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partially explained this phenomenon, namely the fact that American workers had a 
substantially higher standard of living than their European counterpart at the time, a 
fact which had not gone unnoticed by previous leftist intellectuals. Secondly, and 
perhaps most importantly, social mobility allowed for the average worker to have the 
tangible possibility of moving up in society and to attaining a level of freedom that was 
unbeknownst to the European proletariat. 
 Furthermore, “Americanism” was also subsequently identified as a relevant 
factor in explaining the “essence of American exceptionalism”99 and how, according to 
several authors, it had acted as a substitute for socialism in the United States. Instead 
of simply symbolizing a combination of ethnic characteristics that identified the people 
of the United States, “Americanism” was as much of an ideology as fascism, 
communism or liberalism. As Lipset and Marks eloquently wrote, “The American 
ideology, stemming from the Revolution, can be consumed in five words: anti-statism, 
laissez-faire, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism.” 100  Thus, socialism was 
infinitely less appealing to the “democratic, socially classless, anti-elitist society”101 
that characterized the United States, especially when compared to the European post-
feudal reality of the 1920s.  
 Moreover, sectarianism, political freedom and the American political system 
itself were also considered to be major obstacles in the path of socialism’s success in 
the United States. Firstly, American socialists were organized in small factions, as their 
wish to be doctrinally pure not only hindered their capability of setting in motion any 
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work, American Exceptionalism: A double-edged sword, where he stated that “The American Creed can 
be described in five terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire.” (Lipset, 
1996, pg. 19 
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tangible course of action, but also rendered them unwilling to work together with 
“mainstream” groups and movements, most of which represented the majority of the 
working-class itself. Secondly, and more controversially, as Morris Hillquit, the 
American Socialist leader argued, “political freedom undermines class 
consciousness.”102 This rationale derived from the fact that, unlike the European class-
struggle for political, social and labor rights that was well underway in the early 
twentieth century, the United States already provided most of those rights to the 
working-class who, in return, did not find it necessary to mobilize against the prevailing 
system.  
 Finally, the electoral system used to elect Congress and the President of the 
United States, which was in place since the eighteenth century and had helped produce 
a two-party system, was recurrently mentioned as having hindered the success of the 
SPUSA. Although Lipset and Marks dedicated the second chapter of their work to 
providing an extensive examination of the American political system, the authors added 
that most socialist intellectuals attributed American third parties’ failures not only to 
the fact that, whenever they gathered sufficient electoral support that could seemingly 
rival one of the major parties, the latter would incorporate the former’s ideas in order 
to eliminate what could be perceived as a possible threat, but also due to the fact that 
the political system that was set in place encouraged Americans to resort to tactical 
voting, as they would rather vote for candidates that had a tangible possibility of 
winning and, thus, of accomplishing what the voters wished to see fulfilled. 
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2.2 The American political system 
 In the beginning of the second chapter, and as has been previously established, 
Lipset and Marks wrote that the American political system had been frequently deemed 
by various intellectuals as one the main causes for having “inhibited Socialism as a 
political movement by making it difficult for any minor political party to survive.”103 
Interestingly, the academics also remarked that previous authors, such as V. I. Lenin 
and Morris Hillquit, were certain that several aspects of the American political system 
– such as federalism and the early “gift of the suffrage”104 –, were particularly more 
impactful regarding the lack of success of the SPUSA than that of other third parties in 
the United States. 
 However, given the overwhelming evidence that the majority of the United 
States’ electorate had consistently chosen to vote for one of the two major parties in 
existence, the authors questioned whether the failure of the Socialist Party was simply 
an element of a larger phenomenon that was present within the American political 
system: the inability for third parties to successfully compete against the two 
established major parties. 
 Indeed, given the characteristics of the system that was chosen by the founders 
of the United States to elect both Congress and the Presidency, which rests on the 
plurality or first-past-the-post system, it is especially difficult for third parties to have 
a chance of winning decisive elections. Since only the winning party within a particular 
constituency receives any representation, the plurality system converts “votes into seats 
in a way that hurts small parties if their limited support is spread across many 
 
103 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 44) 
104 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 44) 
 44 
constituencies.”105 Therefore, the electorate is encouraged to engage in tactical voting 
not only in order to avoid “wasting” their vote on a party that most certainly will not 
win, but also with fear of hindering the chances of success of the major party whom 
they consider to be the “lesser-evil”.106 
 However, the authors argued that the negative effects caused by the plurality 
system could be successfully limited. For instance, third parties may choose to put in 
more effort in the constituencies where they have the strongest chances of winning 
elections. They may also opt for making an agreement with one of the major parties 
within a particular constituency so as to not further divide the vote.107 Additionally, 
Lipset and Marks gathered sufficient empirical evidence which strongly indicated that 
the Socialist party had worse electoral results than a set of other third parties in the 
United States. Thus, albeit having agreed that it hindered the success of third parties, 
the academics did not fully accept that the failure of the SPUSA was mostly due to the 
negative effects of the first-past-the-post system.  
 Nevertheless, due to the substantial emphasis that was given to the role of the 
American political system in the failure of the socialist party – which the authors agreed 
that, to a certain degree, was not without reason –, Lipset and Marks dedicated the 
second chapter of their work to examining the effects of “three distinctive American 
institutions – the presidency, federalism and restrictions on ballot access”108 and how 
their unique characteristics played a part in hindering socialism’s success in the United 
States.  
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 Firstly, the academics stated that the election of the United States’ executive 
branch was especially unique due to the combination of two factors that are particularly 
harmful to the chances of third parties’ electoral success: “the principle of plurality and 
the aggregation of national votes through the Electoral college.”109 Although other 
industrialized nations possess similar features, none of them simultaneously combine 
both factors. According to Lipset and Marks, the election of the executive branch “via 
a plurality electoral system with a single round of voting” 110  creates a political 
environment which is highly prejudicial for third party success, as it diminishes the 
possibility for such a party to “improve its national chances by cooperating with other 
parties to limit competition or by taking advantage of geographical concentrations of 
support”,111 which were previously identified as successful strategies that limit the 
negative effects of the plurality system. 
 In addition, the strict separation between the executive and the legislative 
branches of government also negatively interferes with the chances for third parties to 
gain “some executive influence as a coalition partner.” 112  Therefore, since the 
American electoral system produces strong incentives for a two-party system and, 
consequently, for the consolidation of the two major parties, “factional coalitions”113 
tend to be created “within, rather than between, political parties.”114  
 Furthermore, the empirical evidence that was gathered by the authors made it 
possible for them to declare that, indeed, the Presidential electoral system was 
particularly harmful for third parties’ chances of success. According to Lipset and 
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Marks, although Americans consistently voted for one of the two major parties in 
presidential elections – mostly due to the “wasted vote thesis”, which we have 
previously addressed –, the proportion of votes for third parties generally increased as 
the electoral level decreased. Empirically, this rationale was also applicable to the 
SPUSA, as contrary to what previous observers had stated regarding how Eugene Debs’ 
candidacy had increased nation-wide support for the socialist party, the latter’s electoral 
performances actually appeared to be stronger at the local level rather than at the 
national level.115 
 Lipset and Marks further concluded that the support for third parties during 
presidential elections seemed to mostly vary not only according to the perceived 
difference between the candidates of the two major parties, but also in proportion to the 
importance that was attributed to the election in question. For instance, if there was a 
close election, where either major party had a tangible possibility of winning, “potential 
socialist voters”116 would normally opt to “follow a second-best strategy”,117 in order 
to prevent the election of the party or candidate which they truly disliked. On the other 
hand, if voters perceived an election’s outcome as predictable – and, consequently, 
believed that there was a considerable distance between candidates which could not be 
easily shortened – or were convinced that the latter was not necessarily relevant, they 
would be more inclined to vote according to their true preference.  
 
115 In order to substantiate their claims, the authors provided an example that had occurred in the state of 
Wisconsin. On this matter, Lipset and Marks wrote that “despite participating in less than one-third of 
Wisconsin’s House elections between 1904 and 1932, socialists managed to gain more votes in the state 
than did their presidential candidate on four of seven occasions. In the three presidential election years 
(1904, 1908, and 1912) in which the socialist presidential candidate, Eugene Debs, received a slightly 
higher share of the Wisconsin vote than the House candidates, the party put up only three, two, and three 
candidates, respectively, in the eleven House constituencies.”  (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 49-50) 
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 Furthermore, whilst discussing how federalism impacted the chances of success 
of third parties -– and those of the Socialist party in particular –, the academics promptly 
recognized that it was a double-edge sword. Indeed, whereas some authors believed 
that federalism was “a source of weakness for third parties”,118 others were adamant 
that this characteristic benefited the latter’s chances of electoral success.  
 According to Lipset and Marks, those who were convinced that federalism 
hindered the third parties’ prospects of success often corroborated their thesis by falling 
into one of the two main lines of argument regarding this matter. Various intellectuals 
believed that socialism was unsuitable within the framework of a federalist nation and 
that, therefore, if one wished to improve labor conditions in the United States, one 
should seek to do it via collective bargaining rather than legislation. On the other hand, 
other authors were certain that federalism had contributed to “the fragmentation of 
political authority”,119 making it harder for the socialist ideology to spread across the 
different realities of the country, which actively contributed to weakening “efforts to 
generate working-class consciousness or confirm socialist criticisms of American 
society as a whole.”120 
 Both lines of argument seemed to recognize, to a certain degree, that this 
particular feature of the American political system deemed legislation as an inefficient 
means of procuring labor improvements in the United States. Whilst, in the end of the 
nineteenth century, several British intellectuals, such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
argued that “legislation of working conditions had practical advantages over collective 
bargaining”,121 namely its universality and permanent nature, and that, thus, unions 
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should be encouraged to take political stances in order to efficiently pursue their 
objectives, it soon became clear that the same rationale was not applicable for the 
American reality.  
 Indeed, as Lipset and Marks wrote, “the task of gaining legislation is far more 
uncertain, complex, time-consuming, and expensive in the United States than in a 
unitary parliamentary democracy.” 122  Unlike centralized states, the approval of a 
particular nation-wide legislation within the American political framework requires the 
agreement of each individual state. This means that a considerable amount of efforts 
must be spent on convincing both the people and the courts of each state that the law 
will bring about positive change, which is not an efficient manner of achieving better 
labor conditions, especially when there is a high likelihood that the law will not be 
approved in all states. Therefore, trade unions generally preferred to seek improvements 
in working conditions at the state-level and, even in such cases, state court judges would 
every so often fail to approve the particular legislation on a technicality or by evoking 
the Constitutional right of owners “to do what they wished with their property.”123 
Hence, as the authors stated, “more often than not, unions discovered that legislation 
was effective only when they had the organizational resources to ensure that it was 
enforced.”124 
 In fact, according to several academics, the “distinctive institutional structure 
of the American state” had profoundly impacted the labor union’s strategy since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. For instance, rather than seeking political reform, 
which, as has been previously established, was difficult under the institutional 
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framework of the American political system, the AFL consistently opted for a business-
oriented strategy – also known as business unionism – in order to pursue their goals. 
Naturally, albeit practical, business unionism also contributed to limiting the popular 
adherence to the socialist ideology as trade unions did not wish to undercut their 
independence and self-reliance with state intervention nor did they intend on “dividing 
their members into exclusive political camps.”125 
 However, as Lipset and Marks have previously alluded to, not all authors were 
certain that federalism had a negative impact on third parties’ electoral success. On the 
contrary, regarding this subject, some academics believed that it was a positive feature 
of the American political system, as it divided the national arena into smaller 
constituencies, where, as has been previously established, third parties – including the 
Socialist party – had higher prospects of winning elections.126 
 The authors further wrote that, when analyzing other nations’ realities, it 
became evident that the link between regime type and social-democracy was 
ambiguous. In fact, federalism had not impeded the success of socialist-inclined parties 
nor the subsequent political reforms that came into effect in countries such as Australia, 
Germany and Canada. Consequently, the authors were led to conclude that “the federal 
character of the American political system”127 was not a sufficient explanatory reason 
for the absence of a widespread socialist movement nor the failure of the socialist party 
in the United States.  
 
125 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 55) 
126 According to the authors, this proved to be true on several occasions. As Lipset and Marks put it, 
“social democratic or near social democratic movements were able to win statewide elections and/or 
major party primaries in North Dakota, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Wisconsin, California, Oregon, and 
Washington between 1918 and 1940.” (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 56) 
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 Another feature of the American political system which seemingly hindered the 
electoral chances of third parties, and of the Socialist party in particular, was the 
“complicated and time-consuming process of gaining access to state ballots.” 128 
According to the authors, intricate and somewhat random regulations were imposed on 
smaller parties if they wished to compete in an election. These barriers were imposed 
by “individual state legislatures”, 129  who were “dominated by the major parties 
themselves”,130 in order to squash competition. For instance, in states such as Montana, 
California and Oklahoma, the regulations demanded that minor parties obtain at least 
five per cent of the state’s registered voters.  
 In addition, the latter were often denied ballot access simply due to 
technicalities. For example, this occurred “to the Socialist party in New York in 1946, 
when petitions collected in each county of the state with the requisite fifty signatures 
were held invalid because in some instances the canvasser inadvertently misstated his 
own district.”131 However, similarly to their previous conclusions, although it was 
obvious that third parties – and the Socialist party in particular – had been, at times, 
unjustly denied rightful ballot access, the authors came to the conclusion that it did not 
explain the phenomenon which we have set out to analyze in its entirety. 
 Lipset and Marks further examined the contribution of two other features of the 
American political system, “the gift of suffrage” and party flexibility, to the 
nonexistence of extensive support for the socialist ideology and the Socialist party in 
specific. According to the authors, since white males’ voting rights were granted prior 
to industrialization and without there being a widespread need for popular revolt, 
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“working-class political consciousness”132 in the United States, as the authors put it, 
never came close to reaching European standards. 
 However, Lipset and Marks wished to emphasize that, albeit a relevant feature 
of the American political system, this did not portray the whole picture. In fact, a cross-
national analysis revealed that, although countries such as Australia and Switzerland 
had also achieved widespread suffrage at an early stage, both their political system and 
the society in general still incorporated socialist-inclined ideas, movements and 
parties.133 The authors also noted that, although “the gift of suffrage” was undoubtedly 
important, one should especially dedicate one’s attention to examining a consequential 
phenomenon: the major political parties’ abilities to incorporate the support of the 
proletariat before the establishment of the working-class parties. According to the 
authors, the two major political parties in the United States were able to do so by 
capturing the votes of the working-class people, along with other social groups, long 
before the socialist ideology reached American politics, establishing “cross-class 
alliances.”134 Consequently, as Lipset and Marks put it: 
“The existence of democratic rights in America compelled socialists to focus 
narrowly on worker’s economic interests and to emphasize economic 
exploitation in their attempts to attract workers away from established parties 
and existing channels of political expression.”135 
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 Similarly to the previous argument, due to their dimension and inclusive nature, 
both major political parties in the United States encompassed a variety of opinions, 
promoting the creation of internal factions within their broad ideological scope. This 
inherent flexibility also allowed them to integrate elements of other ideologies 
whenever it appeared to be opportune – namely when such ideologies were obtaining 
increasing popular support –, which not only dissuaded a considerable number of voters 
from supporting minor parties, but would also often seemingly deemed their creation 
unnecessary. 
 In fact, several examples illustrate this phenomenon. For instance, Lipset and 
Marks extensively wrote on how, following the Great Depression of the 1930s, in order 
to accompany a growing “anti-capitalist” sentiment, Franklin Delano Roosevelt played 
an important role in steering the Democratic party to the left, whilst both ensuring the 
preservation of the two-party system and the stability of the American political system 
as a whole. According to the authors, the former President was able to do so not only 
by co-opting a series of leftist ideas – that had become prevalent amongst the American 
people –, but also by integrating the leaders of a set of radical and alternative 
movements into his own body of support, which, as Lipset and Marks put it, “reflected 
conscious efforts to undercut left-wing radicals, to preserve capitalism.” 136  Thus, 
although the conditions at the time were favorable for the emergence of a viable 
Socialist party in the United States, the authors argued that “the constitutional system 
and the brilliant way in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt co-opted the left prevented 
this.”137 
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 In conclusion, whilst most arguments that were presented regarding how a set 
of features of the American political system negatively influenced the success of 
socialist movements – and the Socialist party in particular – in the United States were 
compelling, Lipset and Marks once again noted that, in their view, they did not fully 
explain this complex phenomenon.  
 In fact, none of them provided an explanation for why leftist intellectuals were 
never able to create powerful factions within one of the two major parties with the intent 
to introduce socialist-inclined policies into mainstream politics, contrary not only to 
what had happened in other industrialized democracies, but also within the Republican 
party, which had, on several occasions, been influenced by “more conservative and 
libertarian groups.”138 Additionally, unlike what occurred in the United States, cross-
national examinations demonstrated that social democratic parties in other 
industrialized democracies where the two-party system was in effect were able to 
successfully overcome a set of barriers and become predominant actors in the political 
scene. 
 Furthermore, although one may unquestionably argue that several elements of 
the American political system acted as barriers to the triumph of third parties, they also 
did not account for why the Socialist party had worse electoral performances than other 
minor parties on numerous occasions since the end of the nineteenth century139 nor why 
Socialist leaders had never become “a major vehicle for protest in the United States.”140 
 
138 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 82) 
139 On this matter, Lipset and Marks wrote that “since the Civil War, socialist electoral performance has 
been eclipsed by the Greenbackers with more than a million votes in the midterm elections of 1878, the 
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2.3 The relation between the Socialist party and the trade unions 
In the following chapter, Lipset and Marks set out to explain why there had 
consistently been an evident separation between the American socialist movement and 
the trade unions, which they firmly characterized as being “one of the greatest 
weaknesses of the socialist movement in America.”141 As a result, the authors wished 
to explain whether the SPUSA or the major trade unions should be held accountable 
for this phenomenon and its widespread impacts.  
As Lipset and Marks put it, “the separation of political from economic 
organization distinguishes the left in the United States from that in every other 
industrialized democracy.”142 According to the authors, this division had been present 
ever since the establishment of the main American trade unions, which, albeit a few 
exceptions – such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the federation of 
unions that famously had communist influences –, had “remained free from party-
political control.”143 Indeed, instead of pushing for the creation of a new party or 
supporting alternative movements, the most influential trade unions (and federation of 
unions) in the United States – with a special emphasis on the AFL and CIO –, preferred 
to exert influence by cooperating with the two major parties, especially with the 
Democratic party.  
Whilst analyzing these issues, the authors firstly wished to emphasize how 
American trade unions greatly differed from other labor organizations around the 
world. In order to do so, they explained that American unionism was not only a 
reflection of the American peoples’ values, but also of the institutional framework 
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imbedded within its society. These characteristics helped create a favorable 
environment for the establishment of exclusive (or craft) unions – rather than inclusive 
(or industrial/general) unions –, which dominated the American labor movement.  
According to the authors’ understandings, the former type of unionism was 
“based on skilled groups of “craft” workers who attempt to improve their working 
conditions mainly by limiting the inflow of unskilled workers into their job territory”,144 
whilst the latter could be characterized as being “based on less skilled workers who 
attempt to improve their working conditions by mobilizing large numbers to pressure 
employers and/or gain political representation.”145 Table 1, which has been directly 
extracted from Lipset and Marks’ book, explains the distinction between exclusive and 
inclusive unionism in greater detail and according to different criteria. 
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Note: Reprinted from It didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United States (p. 91), 
by Lipset and Marks, 2001, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Copyright 2001 by Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Gary Marks. 
Although towards the end of the nineteenth century, European labor movements 
became more diversified in order to accommodate an increasing number of unskilled 
workers as a consequence of the societal evolutions at the time, this phenomenon did 
not happen with the same intensity in the United States. 146  
The conflict between exclusive and inclusive unions within American society, 
who wished to pursue their goals using different economic and political approaches, 
 
146 According to the authors, “from the establishment of the American Federation of Labor in 1886 to 
World War 1, exclusive craft unions accounted for at least three-quarters of the total membership of the 
federation in any year.”  In fact, even with the “rapid postwar expansion of unionism (…) the portion of 
craft unionists declined, but it still remained in excess of two-thirds through the 1920s.” (Lipset & Marks, 
2001, p. 89) 
Table 1 
Types of Unionism 
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was a contributing factor that led to the split between the AFL and the CIO in 1935. In 
fact, as Lipset and Marks put it, the dispute also partly explained why the “repeated 
attempts to develop an independent class-based party”, 147  namely one of socialist 
inclinations, ultimately ended poorly. Whilst the exclusive unions, who dominated the 
AFL, adopted a business-like approach and, hence, “were convinced that they could 
achieve their goals through occupational organization in the labor market”, 148  the 
inclusive unions were extremely politicized and wished to “induce governments to 
legislate improvements in workers’ welfare.”149  
Lipset and Marks further wrote that, as expected, socialists condemned 
exclusive unions for perpetuating and, at times, exacerbating the class division within 
society since, according to the authors, such collectives wished to “remain above the 
unskilled proletariat”150 and “to preserve their niche in the division of labor rather than 
to abolish the division of labor itself”.151 Thus, since they recognized the importance of 
the AFL, socialists wished to increase the influence of inclusive unionism within the 
labor organization by supporting the latter “as a principle and as an indispensable part 
of the class struggle.”152 Although such attempts were somewhat successful in a few 
cases – namely in the Pennsylvania Federation, where the inclusive unionism principle 
prevailed and the labor organization supported an Industrial Workers of the World 
strike in 1912 –, they were not sufficient to overthrow the predominant role of exclusive 
unions within the AFL. 
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Moreover, as has been previously established, “American cultural 
dispositions”,153 which, as the authors put it, were “forged in an egalitarian, anti-statist, 
individualist revolution”,154 were also a determining factor that greatly contributed to 
the major unions’ reluctance of supporting, alongside the socialists, an independent 
labor party. In fact, according to the authors, these so-called “American values” had 
been reinterpreted “under different historical circumstances”, 155  often condemning 
movements and ideologies that represented dissimilar principles, namely socialism, to 
failure. 
Interestingly, on this matter, the authors quoted historian David DeLeon, who 
had previously stated that the nature of the “American values” – which included a 
profound esteem for liberty and anti-statism – deemed anarchism to be a better fit for 
the “American insurgent”156 than socialism. As DeLeon put it,  
“Social democracy, communism and other relatively authoritarian movements 
that rely upon coercive centers of state power have run against deep libertarian 
currents in American culture and as a result have never succeeded in developing 
deep roots. Statist radicalism in its various forms has been an ephemeral 
influence in American politics, while the black flag (of anarchism) has been the 
most appropriate banner of the American insurgent.”157 
Notwithstanding the fact that most American trade unions did not wish to 
support or establish an independent political party, there were several attempts to do so 
throughout the end of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. A vocal minority 
 
153 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 97) 
154 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 97) 
155 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 98) 
156 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 98) 
157 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 98) 
 59 
within the AFL – which mostly consisted of a set of inclusive unions and exclusive 
unions that stood for “declining sectors of the economy”158 –, tried to do so on several 
occasions, namely during the last decade of the nineteenth century, when “the most 
severe economic depression of the nineteenth century made many unionists sensitive 
to the potential benefits of broad-based independent political cooperation with other 
hard-pressed groups.”159  
However, whatever advances had been achieved towards this particular goal 
were squashed in 1895 with Samuel Gompers’ re-election as President of the AFL – 
who, according to the authors, “exemplified the distrust of the state among unionists”160 
–, which greatly diminished the chances of the latter establishing an independent 
political party. The so-called “Gompers doctrine” made it clear that the AFL would not 
bound itself to party politics. Instead, it would adopt a practical approach, which 
consisted of “rewarding labor’s friends and punishing its enemies regardless of party 
affiliation.”161  
Furthermore, and as has been previously established, the split between the trade 
unions and the Socialist party was especially prejudicial to the latter’s success in the 
long term. In addition, and as the authors stressed, it also had other widespread 
implications, namely on the Socialist party’s organizational strength, its ideological 
orientation and on (the lack of) class consciousness in the United States. 
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This separation had a grave impact on party organization, which was reflected 
in the SPUSA’s consistently low membership rates. 162 This lack of capability in 
attracting members was an especially undesirable scenario at the time, since 
newcomers, such as the Socialist party, were expected to overcome their disadvantages 
– namely being “outsider parties” and the fact that, in the latter’s case, they represented 
“less privileged sectors of the population”163 – by achieving “power in numbers.” 
Moreover, as the authors argued, even the workers who were affiliated in a 
certain trade union did not feel like they were part of a broader labor movement, nor of 
a subculture or counterculture which exerted special influence on their way of life. 
Whilst in most European countries, being part of a trade union would incentivize 
membership in a “labor-friendly” party, the low membership rates of the SPUSA 
revealed that this rationale did not necessarily apply to the American context. This 
phenomenon was especially prejudicial for the party, since, as has been previously 
established, it depended on attracting members in order to overcome a set of internal 
and external obstacles that hindered the its success. 
As a result, since almost no pressure was applied on the Socialist party by the 
proletariat in order for it to act in a more pragmatic manner and to seek the realization 
of specific labor and economic reforms, the former was steered by fervent intellectuals 
into becoming ideologically strict and, as the authors put it, into fostering “radical 
tendencies.”164 Lipset and Marks further wrote that the split from the trade unions also 
deeply affected a number of socialist policies at the time, especially the decision not to 
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support the American participation in the First World War, which turned out to be 
extremely unpopular amongst the general population.165 One may easily argue that such 
a stance wouldn’t have been taken if more American workers had been involved in the 
workings of the Socialist party.  
Finally, the split between the trade unions and the Socialist party also 
contributed to the lack of class consciousness in the United States. As I have established 
in these last paragraphs, unlike the reality in most post-feudal European countries at the 
time, not only did American workers not generally feel like part of an all-encompassing 
labor movement nor of a subculture which had a direct influence on their way of life, 
the existing structures set in place in the New World, along with its inherent diversity, 
incentivized people not to view their world in class-terms. 
However, the authors believed that the lack of class consciousness was not 
equivalent to an absence of intense conflict associated with the labor movement. 
Instead, as Lipset and Marks conveyed, “industrial conflict rarely deepened class 
consciousness”166 in the United States and American workers “tended to view their 
interests in ethnic, religious, or community terms.”167 According to the authors, there 
was an evident “split between orientations in the workplace and in residential 
communities”168 that was partly due to the influence of exclusive unions within the 
AFL, which, unlike the socialists, wished to undermine class consciousness and 
“segment labor organization into specific trades or occupations.” 169  Naturally, the 
obvious failure in promoting such a sentiment amongst the American people impeded 
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workers from viewing their economic and political interests in the same manner, which, 
in the long term, was especially damaging to the success of the Socialist party.  
Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the validity of their argument that the Socialist 
party’s electoral strength greatly depended on establishing strong links to the trade 
unions, Lipset and Marks provided several examples of American cities where socialist-
inspired candidates and policies triumphed as a result of such a connection between the 
two. This was the case of cities like Milwaukee (WI), Reading (PA), New York City 
(NY) and Minneapolis (MN), where the link between the Socialist party and the trade 
unions was powerful and where, consequently, workers recognized the importance of 
both parts in constructing a solid and socialist-inspired labor movement that defined 
both their private and public lives. As the authors wrote, such ties “provided the 
(Socialist) party with resources, both human and financial, that were lacking in other 
areas of the country”, 170 which ultimately contributed to the party’s success in those 
regions.171 
 
2.4 How immigration affected American socialism 
 As has been previously established, when analyzing the failure of the SPUSA – 
and of the popular adherence to the socialist movement in general –, various factors 
must be considered. Several authors, including Marx and Engels, have emphasized how 
immigration profoundly affected the socialist movement in the United States.   
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 However, contrary to what one might expect and, as Lispet and Marks stressed, 
there was not a consensus amongst intellectuals on whether immigration ipso facto 
helped, or not, promote socialism within American society. Although several authors 
have stated that immigrants, particularly from central and northern Europe, were 
thought to have been a cornerstone of American socialism, others have asserted that 
most immigrants were never truly associated with the Socialist party. Most importantly, 
the ethnic and religious diversity that immigration to the United States produced was 
also considered to have undermined class consciousness, which, naturally, had a direct 
impact on socialism’s lack of success in the long-term. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the American working-class was already 
predominantly comprised of immigrants of numerous origins, which, as was previously 
mentioned, was not necessarily positive for the American socialist movement. 
According to the authors, the strong heterogenous character of American society 
created an “extremely unpropitious [environment] for socialism.”172 The high levels of 
racial, ethnic and religious diversity hindered the development of class solidarity – 
which, naturally, must exist in order for Socialism to thrive –, as people generally 
organized their private and public lives according to group identities instead.  
Lipset and Marks further added that Friedrich Engels extensively wrote on this 
matter during the last decade of the nineteenth Century. Although Engels believed that 
conflict amongst workers was purposefully aggravated by the American bourgeoisie as 
a diversion “to deflect pressure away from themselves”,173 the authors wrote that “he 
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was also aware that ethnic and racial divisions were major obstacles to the creation of 
a class-conscious worker’s movement irrespective of ruling-class strategy.”174 
This inherent characteristic of American society also had profound implications 
on party-politics and, consequently, on the workings of the trade unions. Firstly, as 
Lipset and Marks put it, “class consciousness in the workplace was secondary to 
ethnicity as a basis for organization and political activity.” 175  For instance, whilst 
“immigrants from Britain, native stock, and Northern European Protestants were 
predominantly Republican, Irish Catholics and Eastern and Southern European workers 
were largely Democratic.”176 Thus, since the political allegiances of the American 
proletariat were scattered across the political spectrum, unions had to adapt to those 
unique circumstances and make sensible choices, so as not to alienate a number of its 
members. This was one of the reasons why trade unions were especially reluctant in 
supporting the creation of an all-encompassing labor party, as their leaders understood 
that it would be impossible for one party to truly represent and condense the distinct 
political views of the American working-class. 
Additionally, as Lipset and Marks put it, although it was expected for trade 
unions to strive towards representing the working-class as a whole, a significant part of 
their policy choices during the beginning of the twentieth Century was “motivated by 
the fear that “old immigrants” and their labor markets would be overrun by “new 
immigrants.” 177  The AFL itself adopted strategies that aimed to protect native 
Americans, “old” immigrants and their trades – which, consequently, were aligned with 
the exclusive unions’ objectives and, therefore, such policies reinforced their power 
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within the AFL – from the presumed menace that “new” immigrants, often unskilled, 
posed on the status quo. Eventually, trade unions began to demand greater restrictions 
on immigration, which resulted in an increased tension between native Americans and 
“old” immigrants “who dominated organized labor”,178 and “new” immigrants “who 
remained outside the labor movement.”179 
 Moreover, Lipset and Marks further wrote that in order to truly comprehend the 
role that immigration played in both American society and socialism, one must 
understand that it is not paradoxical to state that “only a minority of immigrants were 
socialists, but, for extended periods of time, most socialists were immigrants.” 180 
Indeed, whilst most of those who supported socialism were immigrants – especially 
Jews, Finns and Germans –, they represented a small percentage of all immigrants in 
the United States. In fact, as Oscar Handlin, an American historian that was cited by 
Lipset and Marks put it, “perhaps the most prevalent myth about immigrants links them 
with radicalism. The overwhelming majority were exceedingly conservative in politics, 
as in other forms of social expression.”181 
Furthermore, Lipset and Marks resorted to quoting the works of several authors 
in order to explain the reasons for such conservatism amongst immigrants. Firstly, 
Richard Hofstadter stressed that the peasant background of a significant part of those 
who immigrated to the United States in the beginning of the twentieth Century rendered 
them “totally unaccustomed to the active citizen role.”182 According to Hofstadter, they 
generally only wished to participate in politics for “concrete and personal 
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gains.”183Secondly, Handlin, Hofstadter and Martin Shefter all emphasized that “urban 
city machines, mainly Democratic, won the allegiance of immigrant communities by 
providing them with services, representation, and avenues of mobility before socialists 
appeared on the scene.”184 Thirdly, many immigrants were not interested in American 
politics, as they only wished to work in the United states for a limited period of time 
and ultimately desired to return to their homeland after having accumulated a 
significant amount of money. Finally, several theorists – including those who were 
sympathetic to the socialist ideology – have argued that immigrants were simply not 
attracted to socialism because, regardless of the problems that America faced, their 
standard of living was much higher in the United States than anywhere else in the world. 
Lastly, Lipset and Marks made several comments on how, albeit its follower’s 
“sympathies to collectivism and welfare”,185 Catholicism also played an important role 
in the lack of success of popular adherence to the socialist ideology. This was mainly 
due to the large influence of Marxism within the SPUSA and, consequently, its “overtly 
antireligious and anti-Catholic”186 character. Therefore, the SPUSA was never truly 
able to attract Catholic members, who, in the beginning of the twentieth Century, were 
rapidly becoming a “growing portion of the working-class.”187 Instead, most Catholics 
became fervent supporters of the Democratic party, a political actor that was especially 
committed to upholding the political, social and economic interests of “new” 
immigrants within urban and industrial areas.  
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Lipset and Marks further wrote that that the strict ideological and sectarian 
character of the SPUSA – of which the antireligious and anti-Catholic sentiment was a 
result – were at the core of why “American Socialists were unwilling to follow labor 
parties in Britain and Australia.”188 In those countries, socialists were aware of the 
fundamental role that Catholics played within the labor movement – given their known 
sympathies for “welfare reforms and unions”189 – and, thus, they “took pains to avoid 
anticlericalism or atheism.”190 In the United States, albeit the existence of devoted 
Protestants within the SPUSA, there were no such active attempts to facilitate the 
inclusion of several religious groups, especially Catholics.  
2.5 The Socialist party of America: sectarians and reformists 
As has been previously established, the SPUSA had been frequently described, 
even by Marx and Engels, as a profoundly sectarian party, especially in comparison 
with most of its European counterparts. However, whilst nearly all authors have agreed 
that the party’s excessive “concern with ideology”191 and inherent inflexibility were 
especially harmful for its success, others have argued the exact opposite, that the failure 
of the latter was actually due to the fact that it was “not radical enough”192 and that, 
thus, it’s attempted receptiveness to incorporate more moderate elements left the party 
“vulnerable to co-optation by non-socialist forces.”193 
Regardless of the approach with which one may or not agree, Lipset and Marks 
wanted to draw attention to the fact that there had always existed tension within the 
inner workings of the SPUSA, especially between those who favored “a short term need 
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for political compromise”194 in order to reinforce their electoral strength and those who 
“stressed the moral aspect of the movement and believed that any goals short of 
complete social transformation were unworthy.” 195  According to the authors, such 
distinctive views “reflected the dilemma of political effectiveness versus ideological 
integrity faced by all radical political organizations.”196 Furthermore, Lipset and Marks 
believed that, in order to truly comprehend the internal tensions of the SPUSA, its 
strategical choices and their consequent results, one should analyze a particular time 
period which was crucial for the party: from 1912 to 1920.  
As has been previously emphasized throughout this work, although American 
socialists depended on union support – especially in attracting members – in order to 
establish a successful party, the SPUSA and the unions maintained strained relations. 
Despite the fact that a set of moderate socialists, such as Morris Hillquit, were in favor 
of cooperation between both parts, the party’s leadership generally showed no interest 
in doing so. According to the authors, there was such hostility towards the AFL that 
Eugene Debs, in the capacity of leader of the American Railway Union, once 
proclaimed that “working with the American Federation of Labor (…) was as wasteful 
of time as to spray a cesspool with attar of roses.”197 Instead, Eugene Debs and other 
socialists supported the “revolutionary”198 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
after its establishment “as a dual union competing with the AFL in 1905.”199 The radical 
inclinations of the SPUSA seemed to be incompatible with the general guidelines that 
were followed by the AFL, especially under Samuel Gompers’ leadership.  
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This evident separation from the labor movement isolated the SPUSA even 
more which, in result, encouraged its leaders to make a set of political strategies that, 
one may argue, negatively affected the American socialist movement in the long-term 
– namely the decision not to support the creation of a labor party. The authors wrote 
that the socialists who were opposed to supporting the creation of a labor party, 
alongside a set of unions, often explained that there was no real necessity for such a 
party, since the working-class was already represented within the SPUSA. Others, 
outright “denounced the notion of an inclusive labor party as a trap “designed by the 
capitalists to stop the growing vote of the Socialist party.”200 In their view, “a vote for 
a labor party was a vote for capitalism.”201 
The left-wing faction of the SPUSA eventually became so predominant that the 
party soon turned against its local government representatives – including socialist 
mayors, state legislators and councilmen – due to their moderate political approach, 
which often included non-Socialist collaborations, namely with local trade unions. 
Municipal socialism, which one may argue was the Socialist party’s most successful 
endeavor, was criticized by the left-wing faction as being “sewer socialism.” 202 
According to the latter, municipal socialism abided by capitalist rules and, most 
importantly, in wishing to solve urgent local problems, it compromised “the end and 
aim of the Socialist party”, 203 which, according to a resolution that was approved at a 
convention in April 1917, was to foster an outright social revolution.  
Lipset and Marks further discussed how the SPUSA’s decision not to support 
the First World War not only had an overall adverse effect, but was also taken due to 
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the party’s isolation from the labor movement and its devotion to ideological purity. 
Whilst the decision not to support the First World War in its early years – on the grounds 
that “Socialists opposed foreign wars as imperialist conflicts fought on behalf of 
capitalist class interests”204 –, was not harmful at first, their refusal to review their 
choice once the United States entered the war, unlike what most American unions did, 
proved to be extremely detrimental. According to several intellectuals, “the Socialists’ 
determination to pursue an ethical policy led to an organizational collapse from which 
they never recovered.” 205  As the authors stressed, unlike the trajectory of their 
European counterparts, votes for the Socialist Party in the United States “fell to almost 
half”206 during the years of the First World War as numerous voters and party members 
chose to support Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic party instead. Additionally, 
whatever support the American socialists may have wished to gain from the unions, 
whose role within society was reinforced during this period, was never given, due to 
the generally strained relations that they maintained.  
Although, by the end of the chapter, Lispet and Marks’ positions became 
increasingly clear, once again the authors reiterated that the lack of success of the 
Socialist party must be analyzed in a comprehensive manner, and that, as such, one 
must not “emphasize mistakes in strategy or extremist ideologies as the crucial factors 
affecting Socialist support.” 207  As the authors put it, “the failure of socialism in 
America was overdetermined”208 and, although the party would have blatantly gained 
if its leadership had chosen to proceed in a “less factionalized and more pragmatic”209 
 
204 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 184) 
205 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 185) 
206 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 186) 
207 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 200) 
208 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 200) 
209 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 200) 
 71 
manner, “a strategy adapted to the particular circumstances of American society and 
culture was regarded by most Socialist leaders, as well as followers, as unprincipled, 
even if it might promise electoral success.”210 
Lastly, the authors delved into why the SPUSA had such a strong sectarian 
propensity, especially when compared to their European counterparts. In their view, 
this was mostly due to the fact that, whilst European Socialist or labor parties were 
forced to “adjust to the existence of affiliated union movements oriented to improving 
conditions within capitalism”,211 the SPUSA was isolated from the rest of the labor 
movement, particularly from the unions and their members, which entailed that it 
wasn’t incentivized to compromise its views. According to the authors, “like the 
Russian Bolsheviks, the American Socialist party was isolated from the inherently 
broad reformist stream of trade unionism.” 212 
Interestingly, the authors ended by arguing how “the influence of Protestant 
sectarianism” 1 on shaping American values and, consequently, on the overall 
structuring of the nation’s society, might also partly explain the sectarian nature of the 
SPUSA. Lipset and Marks added that, whilst such overt “pietistic moralism”213 was 
generally avoided by the two major parties in order to appeal to larger groups of people 
and, hence, boost their electoral chances, this was not necessarily the case with other 
organizations and social movements, some of which did not shy away from embracing 
such a conspicuous sectarian nature. On this subject, the authors wrote that: 
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“The sectarian denominations have fostered a variety of moralistic responses 
from prohibition to militant anti-abortion efforts and recurrent opposition to war 
(…) Given the influence of religious sectarianism on American values, it is not 
surprising that the American socialist parties have been more sectarian than 
socialist parties in other industrialized nations, and have been relatively 
unwilling to compromise their ideological convictions.”214 
Tocqueville also famously wrote about the role of religion in American society 
and not only how, contrary to the continental European experience, there was no 
evident tension between the latter and liberty, but also how the “safeguard of morality 
is religion, and morality is its best security of law as well as the surest pledge of 
freedom.”215 
 
2.6 Socialists and communists in the United States 
Whilst, as Lipset and Marks put it, “before WW1 (…) the labor movement was 
split by enmity between Socialists and mainstream unionists”,216 ever since the 1920s, 
“the political wing of the labor movement was itself divided between mutually 
antagonistic Socialists and Communists.”217 Hence, the authors were keen on analyzing 
what they considered to be a decisive time period, the 1930s, in order to comprehend 
the power struggle that existed between both parts, in addition to the distinct strategies 
which they employed to “capitalize on Depression-born discontent and the 
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radicalization of a significant segment of the population”,218 as well as their consequent 
results.  
At the start of the 1930s, the Socialist party had only 8000 members, which, as 
the authors wrote, put the latter “in a poor position to take advantage of burgeoning 
mass discontent at the start of the Depression.”219 However, merely two years later, 
party membership reached 15000 people and the socialist presidential candidate 
Norman Thomas obtained 2.5 per cent of the votes at the national level, more than 
double of what had been achieved in 1928. Albeit the increase in numbers and the fact 
that, according to Lipset and Marks, “the years 1932-1933 were the high point of 
Socialist strength during the Depression”, 220  the authors further emphasized that 
socialist leaders had hoped for a better outcome and that they attributed their meagre 
results to tactical voting, as a significant amount of leftist sympathizers preferred to 
vote for Franklin Delano Roosevelt, rather than for Norman Thomas, in order to keep 
the Republican candidate Herbert Hoover from winning the elections.  
Nevertheless, there was a rapid decline in the following years, which the authors 
not only attributed to both President Roosevelt and the New Deal, but also to the 
“endemic factionalism”221 that, according to them, plagued the Socialist party. Lipset 
and Marks wrote that during the 1930s, the militant left – a faction that operated within 
the Socialist party which was “largely based on young recruits”222 and that “sought out 
to give the party a revolutionary cast and favored a united front with the 
Communists” 223  – became increasingly powerful within the party structure and 
 
218 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 204) 
219 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 205) 
220 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 206) 
221 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 206) 
222 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 206) 
223 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 206) 
 74 
eventually motivated the Old Guard’s – which was “composed primarily of party 
veterans who were largely European and self-educated” 224  and that “opposed 
revolutionary rhetoric and cooperation with the Communists”225 – departure from the 
Socialist party and their consequent regrouping as the Social Democratic Federation in 
1936.  
The split – or according to the authors, “expulsion, as the Old Guard defined 
the situation”226 – aggravated the condition of an already frail Socialist Party. This 
division not only brought about “a 40 percent fall in Socialist Party membership, a sharp 
decline in influence within the various garment unions, and loss of control over various 
party institutions such as the Jewish Daily Forward, the New Leader and the Rand 
School (a party educational center in New York)”227, but also, contrary to what one 
might expect, did not foster unity within the party structure, which remained 
incohesive.  
However, Lipset and Marks argued that it was President Roosevelt and the New 
Deal that weakened the Socialist party the most. At a time of severe hardship, his leftist 
policies attracted not only most of the voters who were already inclined to vote for the 
Democratic party, but also those who were positioned to their left on the political 
spectrum. As the authors put it, “his economic and trade union policies had great appeal 
to the poor, to the unemployed, to African-Americans, and to trade unionists and their 
leaders.”228 Roosevelt’s progressive plan for the United States became so appealing that 
numerous socialists overtly argued that their party should have endorsed his 
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Presidential candidacies, believing that it was the closest and most viable political 
embodiment of their leftist agenda. Additionally, many socialists and union leaders 
came to be closely linked to the Democratic party, the President and his advisers, 
playing an important role in securing mass support from different organizations within 
the labor movement, particularly at the local level, in several American states.  
Nonetheless, according to the authors, socialist leader Norman Thomas was not 
convinced that his party should support Roosevelt’s plan – despite its general popularity 
amongst the American people – and, thus, chose not to alter his strategy. Thomas 
personally opposed Roosevelt due to strong ideological beliefs, namely that “a socialist 
movement could not be built through support of major-party candidates, that the 
socialists must educate the population, and that reforms could not eliminate capitalist 
unemployment and war.”229 The fact that the socialist leader chose not to support 
Roosevelt but, instead, opted to run against him in the presidential elections of 1936 
was, yet again, a decision that not only decimated the party’s membership to little more 
than 10,000 people, but also practically eliminated whatever influence it still had in the 
labor movement.  
Although it soon became evident that the Socialist party was no longer able to 
attract the support that they had received just a few years before – so much so that 
Norman Thomas suggested suspending its electoral activity in 1938 –, with the 
outbreak of World War II, it was decided that Thomas should run against Roosevelt on 
a “peace platform”230 in the presidential elections of 1940. The authors argued that such 
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a choice was a strong indicator of the profoundly sectarian nature of the SPUSA. On 
this matter, Lipset and Marks wrote: 
“There is no better example of the party’s sectarianism than its persistence in 
maintaining its historical opposition to capitalist wars in the face of the Nazi 
juggernaut, a position rejected by every other affiliate of the Socialist 
International.”231  
Whilst the socialist strategy that was employed during the 1930s may best be 
described as having been dictated by a fierce desire to remain ideologically pure, which 
often entailed sacrificing the party’s political tactic for the nobility of the cause, the 
communists’ “opportunistic reformist strategy”232 of the second-half of the decade 
revealed, as the authors put it, “how leftist movements in America could gain support 
by dropping sectarian policies.”233  
Although the meagre Communist Party of the United States of America 
(CPUSA) entered the 1930s with an “ultraleftist sectarian line dictated to it by Joseph 
Stalin and the Communist International”234 – which prompted a refusal to cooperate 
with other leftist or labor organizations, including the Socialist party and the AFL, both 
of whom they labelled as “Social Fascists”235 –, this strategy was dropped due to 
international guidelines that reflected the menace that Nazi Germany constituted to the 
Soviet Union. Thus, alongside other political groups and parties, all communist 
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organizations became united in a “Popular Front”236, which encouraged widespread 
cooperation between “all progressive forces and nations against the fascists.” 237  
During this time, the public face of American communism underwent a 
profound change, which was not only reflected in the overt support for Roosevelt and 
his policies, but especially in the elimination of certain expressions and concepts which 
had always been a core component of the communist ideology – namely capitalist 
exploitation – from any formal texts, such as the party’s national program. According 
to the authors, such a strategy was extremely successful in the United States, since the 
Communist party was said to have reached nearly 100,000 members – of which 
approximately 30,000 derived from the Young Communist League – in 1939, which 
represented a significant increase compared to what they had registered a decade 
earlier, when it had only been comprised of 7,500 members.238 
This pattern of an ever-changing strategy that was based on the dictates of 
Moscow was maintained until the Cold War. Whilst uphold for the “Popular Front” 239 
temporarily ceased in 1939, due to the Stalin-Hitler pact, it was quickly reintroduced 
after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. In fact, the authors emphasized that, 
in order to demonstrate full support and aid in facilitating the interventionist policies of 
President Roosevelt, the Communist Party of the United States of America “even 
formally dissolved as a party in 1944 to become the Communist Political Association, 
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describing itself as a “non-party associations of Americans”240 which “adheres to the 
principles of scientific socialism.”241  
However, once again, American communists restored their political party and 
returned to their ideologically rigorous strategy as soon as World War II ended and the 
Cold War began, not without banishing their leader, Earl Browder, “for excessive 
opportunism.”242 This choice negatively affected not only the party’s membership – 
which was also deeply influenced by the repression that was exerted against its 
members during the so-called McCarthyism period –, but also overall communist 
influence in American society, particularly the labor movement, which, albeit the 
party’s electoral weakness, had been slowly but steadily conquered due to their 
extraordinary organizational skills.  
2.7 Socialism and repression 
Whilst they were approaching the end of their argument, Lipset and Marks 
remarked that various authors believed it to be true that most of the mainstream 
arguments which were formulated in order to explain the lack of success of the socialist 
movement in the United States had failed to emphasize the role of an important 
contributing factor: the repression of American socialists and communists, especially 
following World War I and during the Korean War.  
According to Lipset and Marks, there was no denying that the state had 
intentionally exerted power in order to “intimidate, harass, and jail members and leaders 
of left-wing movements in America”243, particularly in times of war. However, the 
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authors were not entirely convinced that repression had solely produced negative 
effects on such groups and, instead, believed it to be “double-edge.”244 In fact, as the 
authors emphasized, several leaders and their groups gained popularity from both state 
and popular repression, which they redirected towards the “justice of their cause”,245 
often galvanizing supporters who arguably might not have been engaged in such causes 
under different circumstances. This was the case with Eugene Debs’ famous 
imprisonment in 1919 – under the charges of sedition –, and the violent reactions 
towards Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights demonstrations – particularly those 
in Selma and Birmingham, Alabama. One may argue, as did the authors, that, following 
these events, their causes gained momentum amongst the American population. 
Nevertheless, Lipset and Marks warned that “state repression is not always self-
defeating.”246  This is especially true when a government does not shy away from 
employing “total repression”247 and, therefore, engages in the “most brutal attacks.”248 
Yet, as the authors pointed out, even when such extreme measures had been employed 
– which was the case “ in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and, to a lesser degree, during 
the Franco regime in Spain and Pinochet’s rule in Chile”249 –, they did not produce the 
desired effects in the long-term. As Lipset and Marks put it, “it [total repression] does 
not appear to be a stable outcome, either in sustaining the regime or in eliminating the 
sources of radical opposition.”250 
Furthermore, in order to analyze whether repression was in fact an important 
contributing factor towards inhibiting socialism in the United States, the authors set out 
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to compare its effects on the national context with that of other countries and, 
subsequently, of its impact on several American states. In essence, albeit stronger than 
what occurred in the United States, state repression in Germany, Czarist Russia and 
Argentina was counterproductive, as the main leftist parties in each country – the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the (Russian) Social Democratic Party and the Socialist party, 
respectively –, towards which it had been directed against, either strengthened their 
membership or electoral support.  
Moreover, as has been previously mentioned, although the decision not to 
support World War I – which was maintained after 1917 –, produced widespread 
negative results for the American Socialist party as a whole, the authors drew attention 
to the fact that this stance – which precipitated a period of intense political repression 
–, produced “considerable regional variation”251 on an internal level. For instance, 
whilst socialists in Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York City and Reading were 
generally able to resist state repression, the latter annihilated the Socialist Party in 
Oklahoma. According to the authors, several factors influenced the efficacy of the 
repression that was directed at leftist organizations, namely the size of the communities 
– repression was especially efficient in smaller and rural communities –, the degree of 
support or hostility towards the anti-war stance, the inhabitant’s ethnicities – which also 
frequently determined their viewpoint on World War I – and their general connection 
to the labor movement.  
Although the authors were especially focused on the post-World War I 
experience, which arguably directly impacted socialist sympathizers the most, they 
reserved part of the chapter towards analyzing subsequent communist repression during 
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the Korean War, a period also known as McCarthyism. According to Lipset and Marks, 
“from the mid-thirties on, the communists took over as the major force on the radical 
left”,252 thus, as expected, repression was predominantly directed at pro-Communist 
groups during a long period of time. Similarly to what had happened before with the 
Socialist party, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 gave new impetus for further 
prosecution of anti-war groups, particularly those who were affiliated with the 
Communist party.  
However, the authors were keen on stressing that American support for 
communism had faded before 1950, especially amongst those of Anglo-Saxon origins 
– including “liberals and unionists”253 –, who had started to perceive this ideology as 
an external and undemocratic force that threatened to compromise the political system 
of the United States. The authors further wrote that, when persecuted, the communists 
generally behaved differently from the socialists that came beforehand, by not claiming 
“their right to be revolutionaries”254 – such as Eugene Debs had done prior to his 
imprisonment in 1919 – and, instead, denying the allegations that were brought up 
against them. Consequently, as Lispet and Marks put it, “communists themselves 
played into the hands of McCarthy and his allies by rarely defending their constitutional 
rights to free speech, to agitate or organize as Communists”,255 which arguably affected 
the American public perception of communism in the long-term.  
In conclusion, Lipset and Marks reinforced the idea that, although there is no 
doubt that repression may have negatively influenced socialism’s success in the United 
States – nor is there any doubt about the existence of said repression –, particularly 
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(although not exclusively) in the two time periods which have been previously 
mentioned, it never achieved the levels that were practiced in both Europe and South 
America and, most importantly, given the previous findings, it can definitely not solely 
explain – nor is it, according to the authors, one of the most important contributing 
factors – the “[American socialists’] failure to establish a viable political party.”256 
2.8 The end of political exceptionalism? 
In the last chapter of the book, Lipset and Marks provided an overview of how 
American socialists failed in three different manners, as they did not manage to create 
a solid political party or establish an independent labor party alongside the main trade 
unions, nor were they able to infiltrate their ideology and/or agenda into one of the two 
major parties of the United States’ political system. 
After having thoroughly researched the topic, the authors were adamant that an 
unpropitious environment for socialism’s success had been created as a result of the 
interaction of several inherent characteristics of both American society and its political 
system, namely its values – many of which stem from anti-statism and individualism 
which not only has a widespread impact on American culture, but also generally deems 
socialism unappealing –, its political structure – namely “the plurality electoral system, 
the winner-take-all presidency and ideologically flexible major parties” 257   –, its 
heterogenous working-class –  most importantly, the fact that political identity often 
arose from ethnic, racial and religious divisions rather than from the sentiment of 
belonging to a certain social class – and the fragmentation of the labor movement – that 
was especially evident given the party/union split. 
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In sum, according to Lipset and Marks, the interaction of these four factors 
along with human agency – which explains why, for example, American socialists were 
so ideologically rigid, especially when they would have gained from having chosen a 
different stance during crucial moments – provided a compelling insight not only as to 
why the Socialist party failed to become a successful electoral alternative to the major 
parties, but also why the socialist ideology failed to inspire a widespread movement 
amongst the American population, even when exogenous factors, such as strenuous 
economic times, provided the most potential for the realization of the latter.  
Whilst explaining their reasoning, the authors were also keen on reinforcing the 
idea that not all of the factors which had been mentioned by previous authors as having 
contributed to the failure of socialism in the United States – such as early manhood 
suffrage, federalism and state repression –, were considered completely valid after the 
comparative analysis proved otherwise, as has been previously established throughout 
this work. 
Moreover, Lipset and Marks were especially interested in investigating whether 
what they had previously deemed as American exceptionalism was still valid at the time 
of writing the book, the 1990s. After having addressed the critics of the American 
exceptionalism thesis by providing counter-arguments to the main lines of criticism 
brought up by those who disagreed with the concept, they not only argued that the latter 
ipso facto existed, but also that it still applied at the time.  
In their view, even though a significant part of the center-left parties of the most 
developed nations in the world had undergone an ideological shift from their traditional 
stances – which mostly favored a strong state presence in the economy – towards a 
more libertarian approach, thereby fostering a convergence between most European 
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countries and the United States, American exceptionalism never ceased to exist. 
According to the authors and taking into account the time period which spanned from 
1984 to 1995, political parties within Anglo-Saxon countries had generally been the 
object of a larger ideological shift, with a special emphasis on the UK Labor party 
which, after 1997 continued on a similar trajectory under the leadership of Tony Blair.  
However, as was previously mentioned, at the time of writing, America 
remained exceptional in several regards, namely by combining high levels of per capita 
income and low rates of unemployment with significantly low levels of taxation and 
spending on social welfare, the non-existence of a comprehensive medical system, an 
unequal distribution of income and higher poverty rates when compared to other 
similarly developed nations.  
As claimed by Lipset and Marks, this was mostly due to the usual – cultural and 
institutional – suspects, which not only direct and indirectly influenced the American 
people’s widespread negative views on socialism, but also on higher levels of state 
intervention in the economy. Although during trying times, Americans seemed more 
favorable towards enacting a set of comprehensive social-democratic policies – as was 
the case under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administrations, after the strain 
caused by the Great Depression –, as soon as long-term prosperity was once again 
installed within American society – namely after the end of World War II –, its 
population did not hesitate to return to upholding the values that had traditionally 
characterized their country.  
Hence, as described by the authors, the revelation that, according to several 
polls that were conducted in the 1990s, Americans showed higher resistance to 
government meddling in private and economic affairs and to the idea that wealthier 
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people and corporations should pay more taxes or even the fact that nearly a third of 
their population justified their country’s high levels of income inequality as a necessary 
condition for national economic prosperity was not only unsurprising, but it also 
















Albeit the perceived differences between both authors and the time gap that sets 
their works apart, not only do a significant amount of their arguments coincide, but 
their approach to the subject at hand is also surprisingly similar, as they understood that 
the lack of a socialist tradition in the United States could only be explained by the 
interaction of various contributing factors which spanned from the inherent values and 
principles of the American people to their unique political system, amongst several 
others. 
After having thoroughly analyzed their works, there is no doubt that Sombart, 
Lipset and Marks believed that the United States possessed a unique set of 
characteristics which, in their view, validated the American exceptionalism thesis.258 I 
would argue that, in both cases, it is also perceptible that the authors agreed on the fact 
that a significant part of what made America exceptional stemmed from the country’s 
foundation and, consequently, from the principles of democracy, equalitarianism and 
liberty that defined the creation of their new nation259 – and still remain applicable 
 
258 Whilst Lipset and Mark’s work mostly focused on analyzing the validity of the main lines of argument 
that have been presented as being relevant contributing factors to socialism’s lack of success in the United 
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preserve the integrity of the text, not only did the authors always meticulously explain why they believed 
that – contrary to other renowned intellectuals and academics – certain factors were not as relevant for 
explaining the phenomenon or that their effects appeared to be blatantly “double-edged”, but they also 
made their opinion clear on such arguments (and on their own), especially at the end of each chapter and, 
naturally, during the conclusion of their work. 
259 Although he was not speaking of the American experience in particular, in an article in The Economist 
that dates back to 1988, Karl Popper defended that “modern so-called democracies” were, in fact, 
unintentionally constructed according to the rationale that was inherent to his “new realist theory of 
democracy”, where the emphasis no longer resided on the classic question of “who should rule?”, but 
rather on the new problem that arose from the question of “how is the state to be constituted so that bad 
rulers can be got rid of without bloodshed, without violence?.” On this matter, Popper wrote that: “And 
the modern so-called democracies are all good examples of practical solutions to this problem [how is 
the state to be constituted so that bad rulers can be got rid of without bloodshed, without violence?], even 
though they were not consciously designed with this problem in mind. For they all adopt what is the 
simplest solution to the new problem – that is, the principle that the government can be dismissed by a 
majority vote.” (Popper, 1988/2016) 
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today –, which is exemplified by the celebrated passage on the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776, where one may read: 
 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”260  
 
Indeed, the authors recurrently cited several factors which they believed had 
helped shape the overall distinct experience of the American people – especially when 
compared to their European counterpart –, namely the absence of a feudal past, the 
democratic system of government, the tangible prospect of social mobility and the role 
of the Constitution. Such factors exacerbated the egalitarian character of American 
society, thus producing several long-lasting effects. Sombart was especially keen on 
emphasizing how these particularities had created a bourgeois and meritocratic society 
where the “social position of the worker”261 – which he characterized as being “his 
relations to people and social institutions, and in his position in and to society”262 – was 
reinforced. In fact, according to the German author’s observations, given that American 
society was profoundly influenced by its capitalist nature and, consequently, revered 
work (and money) instead of social class, there was virtually no stigma in belonging to 
the working-class nor did the latter “bow and scrape before the upper classes”.263 
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Interestingly, Lipset and Marks remarked that a significant amount of the 
considerations on social class which were made by renowned socialist intellectuals – 
including Werner Sombart, whose detailed depiction of American society in Why is 
there no socialism in the United States? served as a reference for authors who 
subsequently studied the same subject – largely coincided with the previous 
assessments made by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America. As Lipset and 
Marks put it: 
 
“From the time of Marx and Engels, socialists have agreed with Tocqueville 
that social class differences (as distinct from economic class differences) were 
much weaker in America than in Europe. In the Old Continent, people were 
placed in distinct classes by the society. Workers were led to support labor 
parties in response to deep post-feudal divisions in society. In the United States, 
by contrast, class was more of an abstraction and socialists were faced with the 
prospect of persuading workers to think in class terms.”264  
In addition, Sombart was particularly keen on emphasizing how the United 
States also possessed a distinctive set of physical characteristics that, when combined, 
were unique to its territory and which, in his view, gave the means for capitalism to 
prosper from an early stage and in an unparalleled manner – namely its vast array of 
precious metals, its fertile soils and the potential for territorial expansion265 –, thus 
indirectly affecting the essence of American exceptionalism and, naturally, how the 
American population would fail to adhere to the socialist ideology later on. 
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Moreover, the authors made both direct and indirect references to the existence 
of some form of Americanism that encompassed the intangible aspects which have been 
previously identified as having helped explain why Americans were generally 
uninterested in what the socialist ideology had to offer. As Lipset and Marks wrote, 
“the American ideology, stemming from the Revolution, can be consumed in five 
words: anti-statism, laissez-faire, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism.” 266 
Thus, it was not surprising that a society with such democratically-tinged characteristics 
would not believe that supporting Socialism – or socialist-inspired groups or 
movements – was necessary in order to enact reforms or other changes to their social, 
political and economic system, but instead accepted that they could work within what 
was, at the time, not only a democracy, but also an already truly progressive form of 
capitalism. 
Furthermore, the authors agreed that the American political system negatively 
affected socialism’s chances of success in the United States. In this case, whilst 
Sombart, Lipset and Marks concurred on the identification of the elements which have 
negatively affected the SPUSA’s electoral success for the most part – namely by 
ascertaining that universal suffrage, party flexibility and the electoral system were all 
contributing factors to the phenomenon in question –, their approaches to the subject at 
hand were distinct. Indeed, both authors argued that the plurality or first-past-the-post 
system favored the consolidation of a two-party system – such parties became more 
ideologically flexible, as they were more susceptible to aggregating a wider range of 
political views, consequently fostering the creation of differing internal factions – and, 
thus, created an incentive scheme for tactical voting that was ruinous for third parties, 
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particularly at the national level and whenever the voters perceived a certain election 
to be “close”, as was emphasized by Lipset and Marks. 
However, Sombart was concerned with the widespread implications of what he 
considered to be the monopoly of the Democrats and Republicans within American 
society and further argued that it ipso facto conditioned people’s allegiances – 
especially if they were trying to be elected for public office or pass reforms in a certain 
area – and, most importantly, how the incentive scheme was not only reinforcing the 
current system – and consequently squashing political challengers by imposing direct 
and indirect restrictions, some of which were of monetary kind –, but it was also 
strengthening capitalism itself. Indeed, whilst Lipset and Marks agreed that the two 
major parties actively fought to consolidate whatever advantage they could preserve 
over their adversaries – namely by imposing multiple restrictions on third parties in 
order to obstruct their access to state ballots –, they did not further establish a 
connection between such an incentive scheme and the overall reinforcement of 
capitalism.  
Moreover, Lipset and Marks were keen on drawing attention to the fact that, 
contrary to what one might have expected, the effects of federalism on American 
Socialism were actually double-edged. In fact, although several authors believed that 
Socialism was inherently unsuited for a nation with a federalist setting, others argued 
that, by dividing the country into smaller constituencies, there was a higher probability 
for the American Socialist party to compete with the main contenders in such areas and 
ultimately obtain electoral success at the local level.  
Nonetheless, although there was no denying that the United States’ political 
system had unquestionably produced a negative impact on the electoral success of the 
SPUSA, Lipset and Marks were interested in discovering the extent to which this factor 
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could explain the phenomenon at hand. As they pointed out, in some cases, not only 
could those negative effects have been overcome by the adoption of different strategies, 
which would have been possible if, for instance, the SPUSA had chosen to work 
alongside one of the two major parties and consequently infiltrate their ideological 
agenda into mainstream politics in a more effective manner, but it also did not account 
for why the party in question was less successful at the electoral level in comparison to 
other third parties on several different occasions. Lipset and Marks also drew attention 
to the fact that, albeit the unique character of the American political system, other 
nations with similar features, such as Australia and Switzerland, had witnessed the 
creation of successful socialist-inspired parties.  
Interestingly, Sombart also addressed similar concerns and ultimately 
questioned why, albeit the obstacles that the American Socialist party faced, “a party 
that really pursues grand aims and really serves the common interests of the broad mass 
of people”267 had been unable to “succeed in the long run against the old parties?”268.  
Furthermore, the authors referenced how the higher standards of living of the 
working-class and the general economic wellbeing of the American population were 
also pivotal in diminishing people’s appeal for socialist-inspired ideas. Sombart was 
especially interested in demonstrating how the typical American worker compared to 
his German counterpart at the time of his writing. His findings were incontrovertible, 
not only did the American worker generally earn approximately twice as much when 
compared to his European counterpart – the difference was even more significant in 
certain specific industries –, but his standard of living was also remarkably higher than 
the latter in such a degree that, as Sombart put it, it rivalled the “better sections of the 
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German middle class.”269 Hence, in the author’s view, there was no doubt that this 
negatively affected the American worker’s willingness to support an ideology that 
wished to reform the political and economic structure that had provided him with such 
a high standard of living in the first place. Interestingly, Lipset and Marks similarly 
wrote that one of the reasons why the majority of immigrants were actually not in favor 
of Socialism was precisely due to their evaluation of the American worker’s superior 
condition when compared to their own in their places of origin, many of which had 
precisely come from a European nation. 
Moreover, the fragmentation of the American labor movement and the 
distinctive approach to unionism in the United States were also viewed as decisive 
contributing factors not only to the meagre electoral results of the Socialist party, but 
also to the widespread lack of popular adherence to the ideology in question, which 
thus failed to inspire a broad social movement amongst the population. Lipset and 
Marks extensively delved into this issue, noting how the split between the trade unions 
and the political parties was directly linked to party organization, which in the case of 
the American Socialist party eventually resulted in choosing to remain ideologically 
pure, even when the latter would have blatantly gained if their leaders had proceeded 
in a different manner; how the prevalence of exclusive unions – as opposed to inclusive 
unions, which rapidly came to dominate the European labor movement landscape at the 
time – were fostering divisions amongst workers; and ultimately how those factors, 
alongside what Sombart considered to be the American business-like approach to 
unionism, clearly compromised class consciousness in the United States and, in the 
German author’s opinion, was not only producing a “vertical structuring of the 
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proletariat”,270 but was also, once again, reinforcing the inherent capitalist nature and 
structure of its society.  
The widespread societal and political effects of mass immigration were also 
considered to be especially relevant when analyzing the phenomenon at hand. This 
subject had already sparked a debate amongst several renowned leftist figures of the 
turn of the twentieth century, namely Lenin. Indeed, as Lipset and Marks put it, the 
United States was a “nonfeudal, immigrant society with an extraordinarily high degree 
of ethnic, religious, and racial diversity”271 and, as a result, political allegiance was 
largely shaped on the basis of the individual’s identity and feeling of belonging to such 
groups, rather than on social class, which also evidently contributed to the lack of class 
consciousness and solidarity amongst its population, thus ultimately weakening 
Socialism’s chances of success in the United States. 
In addition, the tension between the old and new immigrants, often unskilled, 
aggravated the situation by forging new divisions amongst the proletariat. The 
American authors were also keen on debunking what they considered to be a common 
misconception, which was that most immigrants supported Socialism, and proceeded 
to clarifying that “only a minority of immigrants were socialists, but, for extended 
periods of time, most socialists were immigrants.”272 
Lipset and Marks further expanded their argument, mainly by incorporating the 
empirical knowledge they gained from the tumultuous events that occurred in the first 
half of the twentieth century – well after the publication of Sombart’s work in 1906 – 
and by consequently analyzing their varied implications on the success of the SPUSA 
in particular. The authors were especially interested in demonstrating the extent to 
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which the latter’s excessive sectarian and factionalist character – which we have 
previously established as having largely been the result of its isolation from the 
workings of the trade unions and their reformist intentions – had been extremely 
prejudicial on a number of occasions, namely when it’s leaders adopted a widely 
unpopular stance against the American participation in the First and Second World 
Wars and when they decided not to support the Democratic Presidential candidate 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1932 and 1936 elections, by presenting Norman 
Thomas as the socialist alternative instead. These strategic choices proved to be 
immensely ruinous for the party, whose membership decreased exponentially – from 
over 110,000 members at the height of the party’s popularity in 1912, precisely the 
same year that Eugene V. Debs ran a well-received Presidential campaign, to 
approximately 10,000 people following the 1936 elections –, alongside whatever 
influence it still exerted within the labor movement.  
Lipset and Marks also briefly commented on the effects of state repression on 
American socialists and communists, particularly directing their analysis to the periods 
following the First World War and during the Korean War (McCarthyism), when either 
social or political persecution had been more intense. However, the authors argued that, 
similarly to federalism, repression was also double-edged. As they pointed out, 
although there was no doubt that said repression existed and that it exerted unwanted 
pressure on these movements, several factors influenced the latter’s efficacy – namely 
the level which was applied, to whom it was directed or the size of the communities it 
affected – and, most importantly, History had demonstrated that even when “total 
repression”273 was employed by some of the most brutal regimes of the twentieth 
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century – such as Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy –, they were never truly successful 
“either in sustaining the regime or in eliminating the sources of radical opposition.”274 
Finally, by way of conclusion, Lipset and Marks reinforced the idea that 
Socialism had failed to thrive in the United States due to the interaction of several 
distinct factors – of which they highlighted the so-called American values, the political 
structure of the United States, its heterogenous working-class and the fragmentation of 
the labor movement – and human agency. Whilst approaching the end of his book, 
Sombart also emphasized the important contribution of two distinctive elements to the 
formation of the “American proletarian psyche”275:  the tangible possibility of class 
movement and the territorial potential for exploring free land. 
 
Are we witnessing the end of American exceptionalism? 
Similarly to Lipset and Marks’ approach to the last chapter of It didn’t happen 
here: why socialism failed in the United States, in which – although not exclusively – 
the authors not only delved into whether or not the theory of American exceptionalism 
was still applicable at their time of writing, but also made a brief consideration on how 
American politics might evolve in the future, I believe that it would be inexcusable not 
to carry out the same exercise in my conclusion, especially given the recent political 
developments in the United States. 
Indeed, virtually every reputable publication, be it mainstream or academic, has 
written extensive pieces on how Socialism is becoming increasingly popular in the 
United States, especially amongst the younger generations of American Democratic 
voters, who, unlike older and/or conservative voters, tend to associate the ideology with 
 
274 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 243) 
275 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 115) 
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the Scandinavian countries and their socio-economic model rather than with Cuba, 
Venezuela or even the former Soviet Union. In addition, several polls show that a 
decreasing number of progressive Americans view capitalism in a favorable manner.276 
However, whilst the evidence shows that the majority of Americans do not embrace 
Socialism, there is no doubt that its nationwide popularity is on the rise.  
Furthermore, statistical data and academic research seem to confirm that the 
growing disaffection towards capitalism and the status quo, particularly by millennials, 
is not entirely without reason. Research shows that this generation has been severely 
affected by the convergence of several negative internal and external factors, most of 
which were aggravated by the Great Recession of 2008/2009. During that critical 
economic time period, most millennials were either pursuing their higher education or 
entering the labor force, hence they immediately felt its widespread consequences at an 
early stage of their career, which then impacted several other aspects of their life.277 
However, as the 2019 Poverty and Inequality Report (published by The Stanford Center 
on Poverty and Inequality) emphasized, whilst millennials are being severely affected 
 
276 According to a 2019 Gallup poll, 43% of the American population consider socialism to be “a good 
thing for the country” 276, which is equivalent to an eighteen percentage point rise from what was 
registered in 1942. The figure rises even more when Democratic voters or Democratic-leaning 
independents are asked about their views on the matter. In this case, and according to a 2018 Gallup poll, 
57% have a positive view of socialism, a number which is intensified by the younger generations, 
especially those between 18 and 29 years of age.276 Furthermore, the same poll indicates that Democratic 
voters or Democratic-leaning independents’ favourable views of socialism have slightly increased in the 
last decade – from 53% in 2010 to 57% in 2018 –, whereas their favourable views of capitalism have 
decreased seven percentage points during the same time period – from 53% in 2010 to 47% in 2018.  
(Younis, 2019) and (Newport, 2018) 
277 For instance, according to the 2019 Poverty and Inequality Report, which was published by The 
Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, student debt became more acute after the Great Recession 
for two main interconnected reasons. In sum, the dire state of the labor market at the time made more 
young Americans want to attend college in order to heighten their chances of getting a (good) job but, as 
State funding to public colleges was reduced, the students who were interested in attending the latter 
were met with either a shortage in their capacity to accept them or higher tuition fees. Thus, many 
students enrolled elsewhere, namely at private colleges – there was, in fact, “record enrollment at high-
priced, low-return for-profit colleges” at the time. Ultimately, regardless of whether or not students ended 
up attending public or private colleges, their financial burden blatantly increased. (The Stanford Center 
on Poverty & Inequality, 2019, p. 11) 
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by a set of distinctive challenges at a particularly vulnerable stage of their adult lives, 
some of the struggles that they are presently facing – which span from rising housing 
costs to poor real wage growth278 – are also impacting other generations, albeit in a 
different manner, and its causes can be traced to problems such as “rising inequality 
and declining mobility”, 279  which the authors of the report considered to be “the 
hallmark of our 21st-century economy.”280 This may explain why more Americans, 
particularly young Democratic voters, find Socialism and left-leaning policies more 
appealing than before.281  
I would argue that it is especially important to analyze whether or not such a 
phenomenon is actually exerting influence on American politics, particularly within the 
Democratic Party, and if so, to determine the extent to which the latter has been 
affected. Indeed, the Democratic party seems to have suffered a perceptible shift 
towards the left that is especially evident given the 2020 Democratic Presidential race, 
in which not only were the main progressive candidates – Elizabeth Warren and Bernie 
Sanders – proposing to implement bold social-democratic policies, but the main 
moderate candidates – Pete Buttigieg and Joe Biden – were also keen on incorporating 
components of a left-leaning agenda, namely regarding topics such as health-care.282 
Additionally, albeit never having won the Democratic Presidential nomination, the fact 
 
278 On the topic of real wage growth, a 2018 article produced by The Pew Research Center reads that 
“despite some ups and downs over the past several decades, today’s real average wage (that is, the wage 
after accounting for inflation) has about the same purchasing power it did 40 years ago. And what wage 
gains there have been have mostly flowed to the highest-paid tier of workers.” (Desilver, 2018) 
279 (The Stanford Center on Poverty & Inequality, 2019, p. 3) 
280 (The Stanford Center on Poverty & Inequality, 2019, p. 3) 
281 According to a 2019 Gallup poll and a 2018 Cato institute poll, support for stronger government 
intervention in the economy, for corporate regulation and for a set of comprehensive left-leaning policies 
– such as federal paid leave – have also slightly increased. (Jones & Saad, 2019) and (Ekins, 2018) 
282 Whilst Pete Buttigieg famously advocated for a “Medicare for all who want it”, Joe Biden’s platform 
explicitly states that he wishes to “build on the Affordable Care Act” and that one of his priorities is 
“giving Americans a new choice, a public health insurance option like Medicare.” (Scott, 2019) and (Joe 
Biden for President: Official Campaign Website, n.d.) 
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that Bernie Sanders – a self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist – has run two popular 
Presidential campaigns for which he received a surprising number of individual 
donations is unprecedented. 
Despite his electoral shortcomings, one may argue that Bernie Sanders was 
successfully able to identify and capitalize on the financial and social grievances of a 
segment of the American population and, consequently, to promptly provide an 
appealing left-leaning alternative to the status quo that resonated with a significant 
amount of people within the United States. In addition, besides his well-received 
Presidential campaigns, which have arguably provided the impetus for the kind of 
political shift within the Democratic party that has been previously established, Bernie 
Sanders created “Our Revolution” following Donald Trump’s election in 2016, a 
political action organization whose mission is to “win progressive issue fights, elect 
progressive champions, transform the Democratic Party.”283 In fact, Our Revolution 
successfully endorsed several progressive candidates in the 2018 midterm elections, the 
most prominent being Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, who now represents New York’s 14th 
District in the House of Representatives.  
Furthermore, it seems especially relevant to determine how certain aspects of 
the arguments of the authors which have been the object of my study may shine a light 
on the recent political developments in the United States. For instance, I would argue 
that, by seeking to transform the Democratic party from within, Bernie Sanders was 
successful at identifying what might be the most efficient strategy of infiltrating 
socialist-inspired ideas and policies into mainstream politics, as Lipset and Marks 
hinted at during their work. Indeed, since the nature of the American political system 
 
283 (Our Revolution Website, n.d.)  
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places heavy constraints and produces an incentive scheme that is prejudicial to third 
parties, I believe that, if any form of Socialism is to become successful in the United 
States, it will most likely derive from the influence of internal factions within one of 
the two major parties – in this case, naturally, the Democratic party – rather than from 
an external challenger.  
Additionally, it is possible to argue that the two factors which, according to 
Werner Sombart, were the cornerstone of both the American “proletarian psyche”284 
and the failure of socialism in the United States, have witnessed an erosion over time, 
thus hypothetically providing better conditions for people’s overall adherence to the 
ideology at the present time. Indeed, if one were to follow the author’s rationale, one 
might argue that not only is the possibility of exploring free land no longer a 
distinguishable trait of the American territory – especially not to the same extent as it 
was in the beginning of the twentieth century –, but also that, as the 2019 Poverty and 
Inequality Report suggests, the “tangible possibility of class movement” has been partly 
compromised in the last years.  
However, whilst Bernie Sanders’ 2020 Presidential campaign seemed to have 
gained momentum earlier this year, it soon ended when he was confronted with the 
primary and caucus results where he did poorly in more conservative states and 
amongst certain demographics, namely African-American people. It appears that, even 
amongst progressive Democratic voters, the appeal of a moderate candidate with 
executive experience outweighed the desire for a more profound change that would 
entail shifting the nation’s political direction towards the left. It seems plausible that 
American liberals were concerned with Bernie Sander’s chances of winning against the 
 
284 (Sombart, 1906/1976, p. 115) 
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incumbent President in the next general elections285 and, instead, preferred to choose a 
moderate candidate who could conceivably more easily attract a wider range of voters 
within all demographics. I would argue that this decision not only goes to show how 
the inherent values of what Lipset and Marks deemed “the American ideology”286 – 
namely the strong attachment to “anti-statism, laissez-faire, individualism, populism, 
and egalitarianism”287 – still remain at the very core of the nation’s identity, which 
undoubtedly remains politically exceptional, but also how difficult it is for the majority 
of Americans to view their society in class terms and, thus, for them to base their 
political preferences according to the latter rather than on the ethnical, racial or even 
religious groups that they belong to. 
Indeed, evidence indicates that popular adherence to such left-leaning ideas is 
far from being widely accepted amongst all Americans and that, consequently, it is still 
unlikely that such a socio-economic model will thrive in the United States’ near future. 
Yet, albeit the limited adherence to Socialism per se, as Lipset and Marks remarked, 
popular support for efforts to manage the negative effects that are a by-product of 
capitalism will most likely not subside in the future, especially amongst the younger 
generations and intellectuals.288 Hence, I would like to end my dissertation with an 
extract from the last chapter of It didn’t happen here: why socialism failed in the United 
States, where, amid a widespread centrist tendency in global politics, Lipset and Marks 
cautiously argued that, in fact, some form of social-democratic policies would likely 
re-emerge in the future: 
 
285 Hence, avoiding a scenario similar to the 2019 general elections in the United Kingdom, where the 
leftist leader of the Labour party, Jeremy Corbyn, suffered a resounding defeat.  
286 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 30) 
287 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 30) 
288 Schumpeter made a somewhat similar argument in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, where he 
concluded that, albeit capitalism’s unquestionable superiority over socialism, the latter would triumph, 
partly due to its appeal amongst intellectuals. 
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“There are signs, however, that the influence of social democracy as a distinct 
approach to policy is not exhausted. The seemingly universal shift to support 
for capitalism and the free market may be of short duration. Strong advocates 
of such systems, including Joseph Schumpeter from the 1930s and Irving 
Kristol from the 1970s, have noted that they do not advance the same 
pretensions to solve major human problems that socialism and communism 
once did. Capitalism, the free market, is not a utopia even when limited to 
economic considerations. At best it holds out the promise of a lottery, but like 
all such awards, the jackpots go to a relatively small minority of players. Hence 
there must be many losers, some of whom will be receptive to reformist or 
antisystem movements. The distribution of rewards under capitalism is 
necessarily greatly unequal, and as Tocqueville pointed out a century and a half 
ago, the idea of equality presses the underprivileged to support redistributionist 
policies.” 289 
“At the center of free market ideology is an emphasis on self-interest – in 
invidious terms, on greed. The argument has been put forth from Adam Smith 
to Milton Friedman that the uninhibited pursuit of personal or institutional gain 
results in a growing economy which benefits all, regardless of status or wealth. 
But, as we know, not only do some individuals fail to benefit, but countries 
differ enormously in economic performance. And the business cycle, which 
seems inherent in market economies, not only fosters growth, it leads to 
downswings – periods of economic recession and increased unemployment.”290 
 
289 (Lipset & Marks, 2001, p. 292) 
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